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THE DERIVATIVES MARKET’S PAYMENT PRIORITIES AS FINANCIAL 
CRISIS ACCELERATOR 
 
Mark J. Roe*
Chapter 11 bars bankrupt debtors from immediately repaying their credi-
tors, so that the bankrupt firm can reorganize without creditors’ cash demands 
shredding the bankrupt’s business. Not so for the bankrupt’s derivatives counter-
parties, who, unlike most other secured creditors, can seize and immediately liq-
uidate collateral, readily net out gains and losses in their dealings with the bank-
rupt, terminate their contracts with the bankrupt, and keep both preferential eve-
of-bankruptcy payments and fraudulent conveyances they obtained from the deb-
tor, all in ways that favor them over the bankrupt’s other creditors. Their right to 
jump to the head of the bankruptcy repayment line, in ways that even ordinary se-
cured creditors cannot, weakens their incentives for market discipline in manag-
ing their dealings with the debtor because the rules reduce their concern for the 
risk of counterparty failure and bankruptcy. If derivatives counterparties and fi-
nancial repurchase creditors, who are treated similarly well in bankruptcy, were 
made to account better for counterparty risk, they would be more likely to insist 
that there be stronger counterparties on the other side of their derivatives bets, 
thereby insisting for their own good on strengthening the financial system. True, 
because derivatives counterparties bear less risk, nonprioritized creditors bear 
more and those nonprioritized creditors thus have more market-discipline incen-
tives to assure themselves that the debtor is a safe bet. But the derivatives mar-
kets’ other creditors—such as the United States—are poorly positioned either to 
consistently monitor the derivatives debtors well or to fully replicate the needed 
market discipline. Bankruptcy policy should harness private incentives for coun-
terparty market discipline by cutting back the extensive advantages Chapter 11 
and related laws now bestow on these investment channels. More generally, when 
we subsidize derivatives and similar financial activity via bankruptcy benefits un-
available to other creditors, we get more of the activity than we otherwise would. 
Repeal would induce these burgeoning financial markets to better recognize the 
risks of counterparty financial failure, which in turn should dampen the possibili-
ty of another AIG-, Bear Stearns-, or Lehman Brothers-style financial meltdown, 
thereby helping to maintain systemic financial stability. Repeal would end the de 
facto bankruptcy subsidy of these financing channels. Yet the major financial 
reform package Congress enacted in response to the financial crisis lacks the 
needed changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman Brothers failures were at the heart of 
the 2008-2009 financial crisis and economic downturn. Some said their failures 
sparked a financial panic, others that it exacerbated the downturn. Some said 
their failures transmitted financial troubles emanating elsewhere in the econo-
my in a way that brought the underlying economic damage to a head.1
The Bankruptcy Code did so by sapping the failed firms’ counterparties’ 
incentives to account well for counterparty risk—the risk that their financial 
trading partner would fail (as AIG, Bear, and Lehman eventually did). Policy-
makers at the highest levels expected private monitoring to substitute for public 
monitoring, perhaps unaware that bankruptcy rules reduced those private incen-
tives. Alan Greenspan, who chaired the Federal Reserve, extolled the deriva-
tives players’ “strong incentives to monitor and control [counterparty 
risk] . . . . [P]rudential regulation is supplied by the market through counterpar-
ty evaluation and monitoring rather than by authorities. . . . [P]rivate regulation 
generally is far better at constraining excessive risk-taking than is government 
regulation.”
 Here, I 
show that the Bankruptcy Code’s favored treatment of these firms’ massive de-
rivatives and financial repurchase (repo) contracts facilitated the firms’ failures, 
by undermining market discipline in those markets in the years before these 
firms failed.  
2 As late as 2008, Greenspan praised “counterparties’ surveillance” 
as “the first and most effective line of defense against fraud and insolven-
cy.” “JPMorgan,” he said, “thoroughly scrutinizes the balance sheet of Merrill 
Lynch before it lends. It does not look to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion to verify Merrill’s solvency.”3
We now know that such scrutiny was not thorough. Worse, in the end, the 
financial sector relied on the government for far more than verifying counter-
party solvency, obtaining the Federal Reserve’s and U.S. Treasury’s cash to 
bail out the seriously insolvent.  
  
 
 1. Compare Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, The God that Failed: Free Market 
Fundamentalism and the Lehman Bankruptcy, 7 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 5 (2010), with John 
H. Cochrane & Luigi Zingales, Lehman and the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 
2009, at A21. 
 2. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 2003 Conference on 
Bank Structure and Competition (May 8, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/default.htm); see Ben-
jamin M. Friedman, Two Roads to Our Financial Catastrophe, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 29, 
2010, at 27. 
Counterparties are the two parties to the contract. A contract for the sale of goods has a 
buyer and a seller, the counterparties. In the derivatives and repo markets, each counterparty 
typically buys and sells related obligations. Counterparty risk is the risk not of the contract 
itself (e.g., that interest rates move adversely), but that the contracting partner (the counter-
party) is unable to pay. 
 3. ALAN GREENSPAN, THE AGE OF TURBULENCE 257 (2008). 
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I show here that bankruptcy priority perniciously weakens market discip-
line in the derivatives and repo markets because the stronger counterparties 
know that they often enough will be paid even if their derivatives or repo coun-
terparty fails. Were the Bankruptcy Code superpriorities not so broad, the failed 
firms’ financial trading partners would have anticipated that they might not be 
paid if they had weak counterparties that failed. Understanding this, they would 
have been further incentivized to lower their exposure to a potential failure of 
Lehman, AIG, or Bear. Were the superpriorities not in the Code, each failed 
firm would itself have been incentivized to substitute away from their own 
risky, often overnight financing and toward a stronger balance sheet to better 
attract trading partners. Were the superpriorities not in the Code, the three 
firms’ counterparties would have had reason to diversify away from some 
trades with the failed firms into trades with other financial firms. Were the su-
perpriorities not in the Code, the extra risk borne by counterparties would be 
more accurately priced and, at the higher pricing, we’d have had less systemi-
cally risky activity. Together, those incentives to market discipline should have 
made each of these three firms less financially central and less interconnected. 
They would likely have had less superpriority debt. The financial system would 
have been more resilient.  
These bankruptcy-based problems are not small. When Bear failed, a quar-
ter of its capital came from the repo market via short-term, often overnight, 
borrowings.4
That is the downside of favoring the derivatives and repo markets in bank-
ruptcy. But risk-free investments with a very high bankruptcy priority have ma-
jor efficiency potential. Superpriority investment channels can lower informa-
tion and negotiation costs for lenders and borrowers, facilitating financing 
flows that otherwise would not occur. Such efficient flows, if they could pro-
ceed without imposing costs on other parties or on the financial system and the 
economy, deserve a supportive legal framework. The problem, though, is that 
the major superpriority vehicles come packaged with systemically dangerous 
consequences, because systemically central institutions disproportionately use 
the bankruptcy-safe package. And, while a low-risk channel is supported, some 
major part of that risk ends up borne by the United States as backer of major, 
too-big-to-fail financial institutions. If we could separate efficient flows from 
systemically dangerous flows—and then allow the first, while restricting the 
second—we could strengthen finance in two dimensions. But if we cannot sep-
arate the efficient from the dangerous, we need to choose. Given our recent ex-
perience, the best policy choice with the information at hand is to strengthen 
 Without the Code’s priorities, such a precarious capital structure 
would not have been viable. When AIG failed, its excessive credit default de-
rivatives exposure destabilized it further. Without the Code’s priorities for 
AIG’s derivatives trading partners, such a precarious position for AIG would 
not have been so easily viable. Without the Code’s priorities, AIG’s counter-
parties would have had reason to worry earlier about AIG’s potential to fail to 
make good on its derivatives obligations. 
 
 4. See The Bear Stearns Cos., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 5 (Apr. 14, 2008) 
[hereinafter Bear Stearns Form 10-Q], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
777001/000091412108000345/be12550652-10q.txt.  
 543 
the system in the critical dimension of systemic stability. To do so, we need to 
sharply cut back the priority package. 
Overall, these are not just local financial structures that failed: When the 
financial crisis began in June 2007, we had $2.5 trillion in overnight repos, 
while the aggregate insured bank deposits in the United States were not even 
twice that.5 The overall derivatives market was backed by $4 trillion of colla-
teral in December 2008, and just one type of derivatives market—the interest 
rate swap, explained below—grew to more than $400 trillion.6
 Figure 1 illustrates the market’s explosive growth in the dozen years pre-
ceding the financial crisis. In 1994, the private business debt and interest rate 
derivatives markets were about the same size, at $13 trillion for the former and 
$11 trillion for the latter. In the subsequent fifteen years, the business debt 
market tripled to $34 trillion, while the interest rate derivatives market in-
creased nearly fortyfold to $430 trillion. Combine the overnight repo market 
with the collateralized portion of the derivatives market, and we have a finan-
cial market bigger than the government-insured banking system. If there’s a 
failure in these markets, the initial governing rules come from the Bankruptcy 
Code.  
 
 
 5. For total repo, see Figure 2 and supporting sources. For total insured deposits, see 
FDIC, STATISTICS AT A GLANCE (2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/ 
stats/2007jun/FDIC.pdf. 
 6. INT’L SWAP & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARKET SURVEY (2010) [hereinafter 
2010 ISDA MARKET SURVEY], available at http://www.isda.org/statistics/pdf/ISDA-Market  
-Survey-annual-data.pdf; INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA MARGIN SURVEY 2009, 
at 3 (2009), available at http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/ISDA-Margin-Survey-2009.pdf. 
In an interest rate swap, one party trades a floating interest rate for a fixed rate on, say, $100 
million of debt that neither party has borrowed or lent. The $100 million “notional” amount 
is often reported as the transaction’s size. At year-end 2008, that notional amount totaled 
$400 trillion. But it is the smaller interest payment obligation that is being swapped, with the 
collateral transferred even smaller. That lower collateral amount goes into the text’s still-big 
$4 trillion number. 
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FIGURE 1  
Growth in the Markets for Interest Rate Derivatives and for All Private  
Business Debt, 1994-20097
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A roadmap for this Article: In Part I, I describe the counterparties’ Code-
based advantages. Although several are conceptually sound in that the Code ac-
commodates potentially useful financial channels, most go beyond wise bank-
ruptcy and financial policy. Several otherwise-sensible local accommodations 
become unsound public policy when we account for the potential systemic 
damage they entail. 
In Part II, I show how the Code’s advantages sap counterparties’ incentives 
for market discipline when dealing with the weak debtor. The Code thereby 
discourages financial resiliency. Understanding how this happens adds to im-
portant prior work on the derivatives priorities. Prior work focused on the prob-
lem of financial contagion and a bank-run-style collapse of a derivatives-heavy 
entity, with the Code priorities facilitating a run and collapse.  
Run analysis is important, and I analyze it further. But, regardless of run 
and contagion analysis, I seek to shift policymakers’ focus from the moment 
just prior to the institution’s collapse to the months and years well before col-
lapse. Better bankruptcy law could create better incentives than it does now for 
counterparties to more efficiently structure their trillion-dollar derivatives and 
repo books so as to avoid an eventual counterparty collapse, rather than to miti-
gate the consequences of an actual collapse. This enhanced market discipline is 
where, I argue, lie the major benefits of reducing the bankruptcy priorities for 
the derivatives and repo markets. Indeed, reversing the weakened market dis-
 
 7. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 9 (2010), available at http://federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20100917/ 
z1.pdf (growth in private business debt); 2010 ISDA MARKET SURVEY, supra note 6 (growth 
in derivatives). 
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cipline is important regardless of whether the discipline is sapped by super-
priority or by ordinary priority. We’d want to confront the Code’s impact re-
gardless.  
In Part III, I extend this ex ante, market-discipline analysis by analyzing 
why a financially central firm’s other creditors usually cannot adjust their con-
tracts to resolve the Code’s current major disincentives to counterparty moni-
toring in the derivatives context. Code priorities that reduce the derivatives 
counterparties’ risks and market-discipline incentives thereby raise risks that 
the firm’s other creditors face. Risk is transferred, not eliminated. Conceptual-
ly, those other creditors can reduce their exposure to a risky debtor, raise their 
prices, or watch the debtor more closely. But the relevant players here are not 
always the best informed and best skilled at understanding and reducing result-
ing risks because they often are not themselves derivatives and repo profes-
sionals. The largest affected creditor is the United States as de facto guarantor 
of weakened but too-big-to-fail financial debtors. It can provide prudential reg-
ulation, not market discipline. The United States has no contract, unless we 
conceptualize the Bankruptcy Code rules as its de facto contract. If we do so, 
that contract needs to be revised going forward.  
Hence, one channel to the 2008 bailouts ran through the Bankruptcy Code. 
While other causes are likely to have been more important, the bankruptcy 
rules’ impact on derivatives players’ incentives when structuring their transac-
tions needs further analysis.  
In Part IV, I examine the core arguments favoring derivatives and repo 
priorities. Although several bankruptcy advantages for each are functional and 
ought to be kept, the full range is far too broad. I also add two negative, per-
haps serious, macroeconomic implications of derivatives priorities. The Code’s 
superpriorities were first justified as measures to reduce contagion. But, as has 
been shown before, they can spread contagion as well as contain it. Worse, the 
superpriorities also facilitate information contagion and encourage simultane-
ous liquidation of debtors’ assets in a financial crisis. Both difficulties were 
strongly in play in the financial crisis. I bring forward reasons why the Code’s 
superpriorities exacerbate both.  
Information contagion arises when lending markets discover they do not 
understand counterparty financial strength and stop lending until they acquire 
enough information; bankruptcy superpriority discourages early counterparty 
information acquisition. Collateral-value contagion arises when financiers si-
multaneously sell similar assets, depressing their prices if the market is not ful-
ly liquid, thereby compromising the immediate value of their assets. The lower-
ing of immediate asset value induces other lenders to the debtor to declare a 
default, seize collateral, and liquidate that collateral.  
The Bankruptcy Code allows derivatives and repo creditors, but not most 
others, to immediately seize and sell off their collateral, and to demand and 
keep eve-of-bankruptcy collateral, thereby facilitating collateral contagion. 
These two effects—information contagion and collateral-value contagion—are 
run-enhancing consequences of the superpriority rules we have. I show the log-
ical links between the Code’s payment priorities and these two crisis-
exacerbating difficulties. 
I then conclude. The Bankruptcy Code’s safe-harbor superpriorities for de-
rivatives and repurchase agreements are ill conceived. Like others before me, I 
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am skeptical that the bankruptcy priorities are wise, but my skepticism comes 
from a different analysis, one based primarily on the counterparties’ ex ante in-
centives. The Code priorities decrease the derivatives players’ ex ante market 
discipline. The de facto bankruptcy subsidies for these financing channels ex-
pand the market beyond what it otherwise would be. Without the priorities, the 
players would have reason to substitute into safer financing channels. But not-
ing this incentive alone is not enough to justify a change in policy, because 
lower market-discipline, monitoring, and substitution incentives for some credi-
tors correspondingly mean greater incentives for the other creditors. If the oth-
ers react well, contractually or otherwise, there is little cost to the enhanced 
priority of derivatives. I show that for many systemically important financial 
institutions, their other creditors cannot react well because they are poorly in-
formed or because they, like the United States, are distant and contingent.  
The Code thereby encourages risky, knife’s-edge financing, which, when 
pursued in financially central firms, transfers risk to the United States as the ul-
timate guarantor of the key firms’ solvency. We get more derivatives and repo 
activity than we would otherwise. Financial resiliency is drained; market dis-
cipline, weakened. 
I. CHAPTER 11 SUPERPRIORITIES FOR DERIVATIVES AND REPOS 
Repos and derivatives differ financially from one another, but enjoy the 
same advantages under the Code. A financial repurchase agreement—called 
“repo” in that market—is a sale of a financial instrument, such as a treasury 
bill, with the seller promising to buy that asset back, often the next day. The 
agreed repurchase price is a little higher than the sale price, with the difference 
being the de facto interest. The instrument sold is usually called the collateral, 
as the transaction is functionally a loan. Repos are typically used to finance a 
firm, often a financial firm. 
Derivatives trade financial outcomes such as those of changing currency 
rates or of long-term for short-term interest rates. Some derivatives are effec-
tively guarantees of financial performance of a third party. One party (often 
AIG in the years prior to the financial crisis) promises to pay a risk-avoiding 
party if a third party defaults on its financial obligations. Derivatives typically 
transfer risks.  
These two financing channels, once backwaters for financial flows, became 
mainstream in recent decades. They are treated more favorably in bankruptcy 
than are other loans, trades, and investments. Some of the analysis and Code 
impact applies to one of the finance channels, some to the other, some to both. 
A. The Code 
A failing firm’s bankruptcy filing strips its creditors of rights that they 
would otherwise have. First, the Bankruptcy Code bars the debtor’s creditors 
from suing the debtor for repayment, bars them from trying otherwise to collect 
debts due from the bankrupt, and—if the creditors are secured—bars them from 
immediately seizing or liquidating their security. Second, creditors who are re-
paid on an old loan in the ninety days before bankruptcy often must return 
those payments to the bankrupt, thereby allowing all creditors to share in that 
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value. Third, ordinary creditors, unlike derivatives counterparties, lack the right 
without court permission to set off as many of their own debts due to the debtor 
against debts due from the debtor. Fourth, bankrupts can recover prebankruptcy 
fraudulent conveyances—which arise when the debtor sells its own assets for 
less than their fair value—for the benefit of all of the bankrupt’s creditors. 
Fifth, the Code limits most creditors’ and suppliers’ rights to terminate con-
tracts with the bankrupt. Sixth, creditors cannot terminate their contracts with a 
bankrupt if the firm files to reorganize its finances in Chapter 11.8
For creditors holding derivatives and repurchase agreements with the bank-
rupt, each rule is reversed to favor the derivatives and repo creditors. First, 
these counterparties can immediately collect on their debts at the beginning of a 
bankruptcy while other creditors cannot. Second, they need neither return eve-
of-bankruptcy preferential payments on old debts nor give back preferential 
collateral calls that other creditors must return. Third, they have broader setoff 
rights that allow them to escape handing over money they owe to the debtor. 
Fourth, they are exempt from most fraudulent conveyance liability. Fifth, de-
rivatives counterparties can choose whether or not to terminate contracts. Sixth, 
they need not suffer the debtor’s typical bankruptcy option to assume or reject 
the underlying contract.
 
9
Bankruptcy sticklers may object to calling these priority provisions, and 
they are formally correct. The Code sets forth priorities in 11 U.S.C. § 507 and 
§ 726, and those basic priorities are unaffected by being a derivatives creditor. 
The derivatives and repo benefits operate by exempting the bankrupt’s deriva-
tives- and repo-holding creditors from baseline rules (such as the stay against 
creditors taking action against the debtor or its assets, an exemption that allows 
them to obtain and liquidate collateral in ways that other creditors cannot), in-
sulating them from typical creditor liability rules (such as fraudulent con-
veyance and preference rules), and giving them more rights (such as to termi-
nate unfavorable contracts). But because their exemptions’ total impact is to 
 The total impact of these exemptions and special rules 
is to give the favored creditors a superpriority over disfavored creditors. 
 
 8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2006) (automatic stay); id. § 547 (requiring return of pre-
ferences); id. § 362(a)(7) (setoffs); id. § 548 (fraudulent conveyance liability for mismatched 
consideration); id. §§ 365, 541(c)(1) (debtor’s contract right is property of the estate); id. 
§ 365(e)(1) (providing for unenforceability of ipso facto clauses that make the debtor’s bank-
ruptcy a default under its contract). Bankruptcy aficionados will see exceptions and quali-
fications, such as the need for secured-creditor “adequate protection” and the multiple steps 
for preference recovery. For textual brevity, I state the general rules summarily. 
 9. See id. §§ 362(b)(17), 362(b)(27), 560 (derivatives and repo players’ ability to li-
quidate collateral in their possession); id. § 546(g), (j) (exemption from preference rules); id. 
§§ 553(a), 560 (wider option to set off); id. § 546(g), (j) (exemption from constructive frau-
dulent conveyance liability); id. §§ 555, 559-561 (ability to terminate repos, swaps, and mas-
ter netting agreements); id. (exemption from debtor’s typical § 365 option to affirm or re-
ject). These apply in both Chapter 7 liquidations and Chapter 11 reorganizations. Not all of 
these favorable rules are unwise. Most, though, are too broad. See Part III.B.2 on the cut-
back’s appropriate scope.  
Termination rights are quite valuable when the counterparty is secured. In that situation, 
the counterparty can take advantage of two derivatives exemptions from the Code, by termi-
nating the contract and then seizing the security to satisfy any damages that the bankrupt 
owes it upon termination. Other creditors can neither terminate the contract nor seize the se-
curity. Two-thirds of the derivatives contracts were collateralized (that is, secured) in 2007. 
René M. Stulz, Financial Derivatives: Lessons from the Subprime Crisis, MILKEN INST. 
REV., First Quarter 2009, at 58, 65. 
548 STANFORD LAW REVIEW Vol. 63:539 
pay those favored first, or pay them more, in substance they accord the favored 
creditors a superpriority status. Hence, it is legitimate to call these exemptions 
shorthand quasi priorities, as I do here. The Code favors the derivatives and re-
po players with exemptions, insulations, and special treatment. They do better 
and get more due to those exemptions, insulations, and special treatment. 
The exceptional treatment accorded derivatives and repos in bankruptcy is 
recent. Regulators and lobbyists sought the exceptions when the derivatives 
market was young, partly to clarify some treatment issues, partly due to effec-
tive lobbying of the derivatives players, and partly due to a regulatory belief 
that such financial markets were sufficiently beneficial to warrant special 
treatment. Regulators and market players argued that the potential for one fail-
ure of a major derivatives dealer to cascade through the financial system justi-
fied superpriority. I skeptically examine several of the public-spirited argu-
ments, particularly the clarification and contagion perspectives, below.10
My normative point is not that the baseline bankruptcy rules for nonderiva-
tives creditors are uniformly wise and that the derivatives exceptions are uni-
formly unwise; several baseline rules could be improved if Congress over-
hauled the Code.
 
11
These negative incentives can perniciously affect the debtor itself, its other 
creditors, and, ultimately, the economy. The 2010 Dodd-Frank financial re-
forms ought to have cut back the derivatives and repo priorities. Those cut-
backs still need to be made. Making them would reduce the possibility of 
another meltdown in the pattern of AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman. 
 The point is that we have two sets of bankruptcy rules—one 
for derivatives counterparties and one for everyone else—and having two sets 
of rules is unwise. One set limits creditors’ asset seizures from the bankrupt 
firm. The second set exempts seizures and accords extra priorities to creditors 
holding financial contracts called “derivatives” or “repurchase agreements.” It 
is no surprise that sophisticated finance players seek to structure their transac-
tions as derivatives or repo agreements, because it protects them. By doing so, 
the superprioritized counterparties have fewer incentives to ration their dealings 
with financially weak debtors. 
B. The AIG, Bear, and Lehman Failures in Light of the Code 
This is not the place to describe the financial crisis and the collapse of 
AIG, Bear, and Lehman. Good narratives can be found elsewhere.12 Nor is this 
Article the place to examine the legal, economic, and political problems that 
induced and accelerated the financial crisis. Weakened bank capital rules, regu-
latory lapses, rating agency mistakes, transactional complexity,13
 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
 and the poli-
 11. For example, there may be reason to make some basic rules more creditor friendly 
than they now are (I offer no view on that here), but there is little reason and much cost to 
doing so only for one favored group of creditors and not for others. 
 12. E.g., WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS (2009); LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD 
WITH PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE (2009); HENRY M. 
PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK (2010); GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD (2009). 
 13. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
(2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_%285-26-09% 
29.pdf; Ross Levine, An Autopsy of the U.S. Financial System: Accident, Suicide, or Negli-
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cy and underlying politics of subsidizing the subprime housing market all were 
important. Instead, I cull core features from the three megafirms’ failures to see 
how derivatives’ superadvantages in Chapter 11 weakened market discipline 
and contributed to the firms’ eventual demise. These Code-induced disincen-
tives to greater market discipline exacerbated other problems, made their own 
contribution to the crisis, and are not technically difficult to ameliorate. 
1. AIG  
Consider AIG, the huge insurer. AIG was a big player in the credit default 
swap market, where it assured others that it would pay up if a third firm failed 
to make good on its own debt. When AIG failed in September 2008, its finan-
cial affiliate was obligated on $400 billion of credit default obligations, when 
AIG’s total equity was only about $100 billion. Some of these credit default 
swaps functioned as guarantees of other companies’ debts. Some had AIG gua-
ranteeing the performance of mortgage pools, including those infamous sub-
prime housing mortgages.14
Goldman Sachs was one of AIG’s major trading partners. It had protected 
other investors in the mortgage market on about $14 billion of securities, then 
purchased credit protection from AIG at a lower rate, profiting from the $50 
million difference. According to a former chief of AIG’s financial products 
unit, in a postmortem: “It seems shocking to me that Goldman would become 
so exposed to AIG and kept doing deals with them and laying on the risk.”
 AIG’s counterparties depended on AIG to make 
good on the credit default swaps if their underlying investments in the mort-
gage pools or other companies’ debts deteriorated. 
15 
This suggests Goldman paid insufficient attention to the creditworthiness of its 
counterparty, AIG. But the risks that Goldman took in dealing with AIG are 
consistent with it expecting to have the derivatives priority in bankruptcy, 
which facilitated that risk taking. The Code priorities plausibly distorted Gold-
man’s incentives as it dealt with AIG.16
AIG had earlier been a AAA, investment-grade risk, one of sufficiently 
high quality that its derivatives counterparties did not initially require it to post 
 
 
gent Homicide, 2 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 196 (2010); Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron Rerun: The 
Credit Crisis in Three Easy Pieces, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 43 (Robert W. 
Kolb ed., 2010); Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 253 (2009). 
 14. See Matthew Philips, The Monster That Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, 
at 46; Ben Levisohn, AIG’s CDS Hoard: The Great Unraveling, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 6, 
2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/apr2009/db2009044_488554 
.htm. 
 15. Serena Ng & Carrick Mollenkamp, Goldman Fueled AIG Gambles, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 12, 2009, at B1. The AIG executive had left AIG before its mortgage-backed purchases 
began in earnest. Id. 
 16. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM, FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS TO LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 16-
17 (2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Factors_Affecting_Efforts 
_to_Limit_Payments_to_AIG_Counterparties.pdf. But see Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena 
Ng, Report Rebuts Goldman’s Claim on AIG, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2009, at C1 (stating that 
Goldman’s collateral would not have fully protected the firm from AIG’s collapse). Other 
explanations are possible. Goldman might have not understood the risk early enough. Credit 
agencies, for example, were late in downgrading AIG. 
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collateral. It instead agreed “to post generous collateral if the value of the in-
sured securities dropped or if its own credit rating fell.”17
But the Code’s derivatives exemptions made AIG’s promise to post colla-
teral valuable. When AIG lost its AAA rating (as the value of its direct invest-
ments in subprime mortgages declined) its counterparties, such as Goldman, 
demanded large collateral postings, as their contracts contemplated.
 Creditors can find 
such contingent collateral posting promises to be unreliable in normal settings, 
because bankruptcy law often requires that the favored creditor return collateral 
posted by a failing firm if the firm goes bankrupt within ninety days of the 
posting. The AIG collateral post would ordinarily have been a voidable pref-
erence as a transfer on the eve of bankruptcy, out of the ordinary course of 
business, while the debtor was insolvent. The recipient could not keep the col-
lateral, but would have to return it for all creditors’ pro rata benefit. 
18
AIG, on the eve of its failure, insisted that Goldman return several billion 
dollars of what AIG thought to be its own collateral overpayments to Goldman, 
as front-page newspaper headlines tell us.
 The col-
lateral AIG paid over on the eve of its bankruptcy was conceptually a prefe-
rence, one that bankruptcy law would ordinarily void and force the recipient to 
return to the bankrupt estate, so that all of AIG’s creditors could share the col-
lateral’s value. Were the preference exemptions unavailable, Goldman would 
have had more incentive to structure safer AIG dealings early on, because it 
ought to have feared that it could not keep late-posted collateral. 
19 Had Goldman lacked the excep-
tions from rules barring preferences and fraudulent conveyances, its bargaining 
position would have been weaker, as AIG could have recovered the funds from 
Goldman in Chapter 11. Instead, Goldman did not have to, and in fact did not, 
return the money.20
2. Bear Stearns  
 
Consider Bear Stearns, the huge investment bank and securities trader. 
Bear’s immediate problem prior to its failure was that, like many investment 
banks, it extensively relied on repos to finance itself. Banks like Bear need 
 
 17. Henny Sender, AIG Saga Shows Dangers of Credit Default Swaps, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/aa741ba8-0a7e-11de-95ed-0000779fd2ac 
.html. 
 18. See René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 
73, 83 (2010). 
 19. See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped 
Push A.I.G. to Precipice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at A1. 
 20. See id. If ordinary preference law applied, the eve-of-bankruptcy collateral post-
ings could have been attacked in a bankruptcy. (The relevant AIG affiliate, if in bankruptcy, 
could have pursued a separate contract claim if Goldman breached the contract it had with 
AIG via refusing to return an overposting.) 
Goldman insisted that it was well protected without the government’s eventual $85 bil-
lion bailout of AIG. Uninvestigated is whether this self-protection claim could have been 
made accurately without the Code’s derivatives exceptions for repayments that otherwise 
would have been voidable preferences. 
AIG’s credit default swap business was largely run through a London subsidiary. In an 
AIG bankruptcy, presumably the United Kingdom’s substantially similar priority rules 
would have applied. (Bankruptcy in the United Kingdom is liquidation oriented. American 
bankruptcy is, derivatives excepted, reorganization oriented.) 
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cash; Bear obtained much of its liquidity by selling its securities and promising 
to buy them back later, often the next day. Bear’s sale with an obligation to re-
purchase functionally turned the transactions into short-term secured loans to 
Bear. And, because the overnight loans were typically rolled over, Bear’s repo 
financing became de facto long-term financing, until Bear, in trouble, could no 
longer roll over its overnight borrowings. This kind of financing was common 
for securities firms and was “repeated day after day for some thirty 
years . . . . Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, 
and Bear Stearns . . . w[ere] always just twenty-four hours away from a funding 
crisis.”21
Bear’s short-term, largely overnight borrowing was at the $100 billion lev-
el. With $400 billion in assets when it failed, a quarter of Bear’s value was in 
the repo market, an amount eight times Bear’s total equity capital at risk.
 
22 This 
level had sharply increased from 1990, when Bear’s net repo financing was on-
ly 7% of its total liabilities and only twice its equity. Congress added deriva-
tives priorities to the Code over the last three decades, expanding them in 1982, 
1984, 1994, 2005, and 2006. While it’s hard to know exactly what caused 
what—a growing market calling forth supportive legislation or legislation help-
ing the market to grow—Bear’s financing counterparties would have had diffi-
culty supporting Bear’s short-term repo financings if they had lacked the 
Code’s ever-expanding repo and derivatives advantages.23 And Bear was not 
alone: the portion of total investment bank assets financed by overnight repos 
doubled between 2000 and 2007.24
Because Bear’s repo counterparties could seize and sell their security, as 
they were exempt from the Code’s stay against collateral liquidation after any 
potential filing to reorganize under Chapter 11, they were even less concerned 
with Bear’s viability and liquidity than ordinary secured creditors, who are 
themselves Code-favored but not as extensively. Absent the superpriorities, 
Bear would not have been as able to finance a quarter of its total assets in the 
repo market for as long as it did, as easily as it did.
 Bear was the one that failed, but the entire 
sector financed itself similarly. 
25
 
 21. COHAN, supra note 
 Its repo lenders would 
have lent it less and charged it more. Bear’s mix of borrowings would have 
12, at 5. Short-term financing can make all those concerned 
more alert. But that does not justify subsidy via favored bankruptcy status. 
 22. See Bear Stearns Form 10-Q, supra note 4, at 5. While this is the number reported 
in the media, Bear’s net repo position is more relevant, as it also bought securities subject to 
sale back. Its net position parallels its liability position alone. When it failed, its net repo po-
sition was nearly 20% of total liabilities and six times its equity. 
 23. When Bear failed, it had been using nonprime collateral for its repo contracts. It 
lost access to repo financing when the market would only take government securities for re-
pos. See Peter Hördahl & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Markets During the Fi-
nancial Turmoil, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2008, at 37, 46. Prior to the 2005 Code amendments, 
only repos of treasuries and similar securities explicitly had superpriority.  
 24. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-
2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 80 (2009). 
 25. Ordinary creditors, even secured creditors, can be called on to turn over property 
needed by the estate to reorganize. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541-542 (2006); United States v. Whit-
ing Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983). They may be protected in Code terms, but creditors 
frequently think they are not made financially whole.  
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likely had to go longer-term, thereby better stabilizing the firm against rever-
sals.26
3. Lehman  
  
Consider Lehman Brothers, the long-lived investment bank. Prior to its col-
lapse, Lehman owed J.P. Morgan about $20 billion. Four days before Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, J.P. Morgan froze $17 billion of Lehman cash and securities that 
J.P. Morgan held, and then demanded $5 billion more in collateral.27 Creditors 
cannot ordinarily seize and liquidate their collateral in Chapter 11, but instead 
must wait for the bankruptcy court to decide whether the assets are needed for a 
successful reorganization, in which case the Code requires that court determine 
that arrangements are in place to protect the creditor from deterioration in the 
collateral’s value.28 Because of the exception from the Code’s automatic stay 
for favored derivatives creditors,29 J.P. Morgan could immediately liquidate the 
collateral in Lehman’s bankruptcy.30
The Code superpriorities put J.P. Morgan in a better position than standard 
secured creditors with ordinary loans, as ordinary lenders cannot immediately 
seize their security and would have risked that the bankrupt could recover from 
them their prebankruptcy benefits.
  
31 Because Lehman’s derivatives counterpar-
ties could grab value out from Lehman ahead of Lehman’s other creditors, its 
other creditors lost more than they would have otherwise.32
The Reserve Fund was one of those other creditors. That fund, then the na-
tion’s oldest money market fund, owned $785 million of Lehman commercial 
paper, effectively short-term IOUs running from Lehman to the Reserve Fund. 
The Reserve Fund’s loss on the Lehman paper was enough to induce a run of 
  
 
 26. And Bear’s counterparties revalued Bear subprime collateral just before Bear 
failed. See Jason Hsu & Max Moroz, Shadow Banks and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008, 
in THE BANKING CRISIS HANDBOOK 39, 49 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2010).  
 27. See Darrell Duffie, The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 
51, 67-68 (2010); Susanne Craig & Robin Sidel, Crisis on Wall Street: J.P. Morgan Made 
Dual Cash Demands, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2008, at C2; Iain Dey & Danny Fortson, JP Mor-
gan ‘Brought Down’ Lehman Brothers, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Oct. 5, 2008, at 1; David 
Teather, Banking Crisis: Lehman Brothers: JP Morgan Accused over Bank’s Downfall, 
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 6, 2008, at 11. 
 28. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-362.  
 29. See id. §§ 362(b)(17), 362(b)(27), 560. 
 30. In early March 2010, the Lehman bankruptcy examiner filed a report analyzing the 
Code status of the transactions. Shortly after he filed the report, Lehman and J.P. Morgan 
settled claims from these transactions on terms favorable to J.P. Morgan. Lehman paid J.P. 
Morgan a cash settlement and J.P. Morgan returned some unused, unsold, difficult-to-value 
collateral. See Lehman Settles Collateral Claims with JPMorgan, DEALBOOK (Feb. 25, 
2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/lehman-settles-collateral-claims-with           
-jpmorgan; Linda Sandler, Lehman Brothers Examiner Files Sealed Report on Banks (Up-
date2), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103 
&sid=awa8w7ZOIhbY#.  
 31. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(g), (j). A transfer for less than full value from a bankrupt in 
the two years before bankruptcy is prima facie a fraudulent conveyance, which the bankrupt 
estate can recover from the recipient. 
 32. The Reserve Fund could have faced problems just from the other creditors being 
secured, although the actual transfer sequence suggests a $5 billion eve-of-bankruptcy prefe-
rence to J.P. Morgan that benefited from the derivatives’ exemption from preference law.  
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redemption demands from the fund’s shareholders, ending with the fund’s col-
lapse.33
Money market funds, like the Reserve Fund, invest in short-term securities 
and seek to maintain an asset value of $1.00 per share to indicate their financial 
stability and near-bank-like safety. “Breaking the buck” is considered a shock-
ing event in that financial sector and, when the Reserve Fund broke it, the Trea-
sury felt compelled for a time to guarantee all money market funds during the 
financial crisis.
 It failed shortly after Lehman did, fanning financial panic. 
34
While the Reserve Fund’s collapse has been analytically linked to Lehman, 
Lehman’s immediate impact on the fund’s collapse is less critical than the ex 
ante problem of weakened market discipline. Someone had to lose money when 
Lehman failed. If not the Reserve Fund, then someone else. But if the super-
priorities had not been in place when Lehman built its capital structure and de-
rivatives portfolio, Lehman’s derivatives and repo counterparties’ incentives to 
insist upon a more stable Lehman would have been greater. And Lehman itself 
would have been incentivized to keep to a safer capital structure to encourage 
its counterparties to keep dealing with it at low cost.  
 
This sapping of market discipline, which should be a central consideration 
in structuring this part of the Code but was not addressed in either the legisla-
tive deliberations or subsequent analyses, is the problem I focus on next. 
 
II. THE CORE BANKRUPTCY ISSUE: CODE-INDUCED DISINCENTIVES TO 
MARKET DISCIPLINE 
A. Incentives and Disincentives for Market Discipline 
The Bankruptcy Code’s core negative consequence from favoring deriva-
tives contracts and repurchase agreements is to slacken the contracting parties’ 
efforts to contain the risk of counterparty failure. The systemic impact of the 
superpriorities needs to be evaluated for two classes of financial events, which 
arise at different times: The first is to evaluate the superpriorities’ impact when 
the system is suffering an ongoing crisis―when the question is whether the su-
perpriorities dampen or exacerbate the financial crisis. The second is to assess 
their impact in the years before a financial crisis, when they can sap market 
discipline and thereby increase the chance that a financial crisis occurs. 
 
 33. See Press Release, The Reserve, A Statement Regarding the Primary Fund (Sept. 
16, 2008), available at http://www.reservefunds.com/pdfs/Press%20Release%202008_0916 
.pdf; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-
Frank’s Dangers and the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON 
REG. 151, 164, 181 n.80 (2011); Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved 
Risky: Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 
40-41 (2010). 
 34. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty Pro-
gram for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/ 
releases/hp1147.html. 
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1. Counterparties often have needed skills, but limited incentives  
The priorities reduce counterparty risk, inducing stronger players to accept 
a higher, perhaps imprudently higher, level of derivatives and repo financing 
with weak counterparties. If they bore more risk of counterparty failure, they 
might demand better-capitalized counterparties. Or they would demand better 
counterparty portfolio information, so that they could better price that risk.35
Derivatives lawyers advise their clients to be wary that a counterparty 
might fail. In a leading derivatives lawyer’s guide for derivatives-dealing man-
agers, the author implored firms to develop derivatives risk-management pro-
grams.
 
They would charge the risky counterparty more and the sound one less. The 
weak counterparty would be incentivized to become financially stronger (so as 
to be charged less) and, at least to the extent prices rose, the parties would do 
less derivatives and repo business. The Code’s superpriorities thereby under-
mine market discipline. 
36 These programs should include having senior people responsible and 
accountable,37 with manuals that indicate tasks and risk management. But those 
manuals presumably need not overly emphasize the fundamentals of counter-
party risk, because, says the guide in a lawyer’s sequence on “What the Pros 
Recommend” for risk management, counterparty risk is best handled by being 
sure that the bankruptcy superpriorities have been obtained.38 As finance 
people say, “Due to these credit enhancements, market participants commonly 
view interest rate swaps as free of counterparty default risk.”39 The derivatives’ 
lobbying organization is said to have been formed in the 1980s to find ways for 
the derivatives market to avoid counterparty risk.40
In the derivatives market’s early days in the 1980s and early 1990s, before 
the full range of superpriorities became law, “it would be quite rare to see 
a[] . . . derivatives transaction that did not involve Fortune 500 firms or top-tier 
financial institutions. Indeed, . . . commercial and investment banks even 
formed AAA-rated subsidiaries to handle derivatives . . . .”
 
41
2. Exposed creditors have incentives, but limited skills  
 One must wonder 
whether derivatives’ explosive growth during the past quarter century depended 
on their expanding exemptions from normal bankruptcy practice.  
 But, there’s a rebuttal to the idea that superpriorities sap market discipline: 
Because the derivatives and repo counterparties bear less risk of debtor failure, 
 
 35. That is what Greenspan erroneously thought was happening in the derivatives and 
repo markets. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.  
 36. See PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON, DERIVATIVES: A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO THE 
WORLD’S MOST POWERFUL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 47 (1999). Johnson wrote as a deriva-
tives lawyer and former chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the market’s 
main regulator. 
 37. See id. at 49. 
 38. See id. at 115-16.  
 39. Michael Johannes & Suresh Sundaresan, The Impact of Collateralization on Swap 
Rates, 62 J. FIN. 383, 383 (2007); accord BRUCE TUCKMAN, FIXED INCOME SECURITIES: 
TOOLS FOR TODAY’S MARKETS 388-90 (2d ed. 2002). 
 40. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 48 n.*, 49 (2010). 
 41. JOHNSON, supra note 36, at 56. 
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the debtor’s other creditors correspondingly bear more risk. One could mista-
kenly believe that the total level of incentives for market discipline and for risk 
rationing stays the same, as a sort of Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition. 
But this is not the case.42
The Code’s priority modulation is unlikely to leave total monitoring incen-
tives unaffected, because the other players in the failing financial firm’s capital 
structure are too often poorly positioned either to monitor that firm or to wield 
other means of market discipline. Most importantly, the other players include 
the United States government as contingent guarantor of the liabilities of firms 
that are too big to fail. It is poorly positioned to fully replace market discipline 
via adequate prudential regulation. 
 
a. Commercial paper (Lehman)  
When it failed, Lehman had sold $4.8 billion of its commercial paper.43 
Like Bear, it heavily financed itself via repo. The unwillingness of the com-
mercial paper market to roll over Lehman’s obligations was a proximate cause 
of Lehman’s failure.44
I do not assert that the commercial paper market has no market-discipline 
capacity, nor that the repo and commercial paper markets are sharply separate. 
Often they involve the same money market players, who sometimes “do repo” 
and sometimes buy commercial paper. Investors, especially mixed investors 
who buy both, do not always sharply sort out counterparty risk from collateral 
risk when investing. At the beginning of 2007, taxable money market funds like 
the Reserve Fund held on average a third of their portfolio in commercial pa-
per, a sixth in repos.
 Commercial paper buyers operate on very small mar-
gins. They invest for the very short term, do not write financial covenants into 
their investments, and are not positioned to monitor their debtors in the fine-
textured manner of bank loan officers. 
45
And, typically, commercial paper buyers do ultimately react to counterpar-
ty risk, but often not until it’s too late for the failing firm to recover. When the 
commercial paper market comes to understand that the firm is failing, it refuses 
to roll over purchases of that firm’s commercial paper when the paper comes 
 
 
 42. Modigliani and Miller showed that a firm’s risks emanated from its underlying op-
erations, not from how it sliced up its capital structure, absent transaction costs and benefits. 
Here, the risk of counterparty failure emanates from the counterparty’s underlying business; 
if one creditor bears less risk, another takes on more. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. 
Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. 
ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
 43. Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 24 (July 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter Lehman Form 10-Q], available at http://www.secinfo.com/d11MXs.t1C1k.htm 
#1stPage.  
 44. See INT’L MONETARY FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC 
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS 19-22 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/100109a.pdf. Lehman lost access to other 
financing sources as well, and the coup de grâce came when “its clearing bank, JPMorgan, 
cut its credit line.” Id. at 19. 
 45. See Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 33, at 36; Adam Copeland, Antoine Martin 
& Michael Walker, The Tri-Party Repo Market Before the 2010 Reforms 25, 37 (Fed. Re-
serve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 477, 2010), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/        
research/staff_reports/sr477.pdf. 
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due. As happened for Lehman, the refusal to roll over then becomes a prox-
imate cause of the firm’s failure.  
Commercial paper buyers will learn from their mistakes; presumably they 
now better understand the risks of buying paper from firms with large open-
ended derivatives portfolios. Although their market discipline and reactive po-
tential was, and is, hampered by the opacity of the derivatives market,46
b. Unsecured policyholders (AIG)  
 they 
should adjust going forward either by demanding a premium or by avoiding ex-
cessive exposure to that market. Or, with potentially negative systemic effects, 
they may conclude that the best self-protection going forward is to get the su-
perpriority benefits of repo protection. 
A large portion of an insurance company’s creditors are unsecured policy-
holders. The Code’s superpriorities could put them at risk if the insurance 
firm’s affiliated financial products subsidiary fails and the insurance assets are 
not adequately segregated (or are not worth enough). Cross guarantees are (and 
were) common, and the businesses are hard to fully separate.47
c. Unsecured depositors and bank creditors (Citigroup)  
 Of course, poli-
cyholders are poorly positioned to monitor the insurer’s derivatives portfolio, 
because too often they are small retail insurance consumers who lack the skills 
to evaluate the insurer’s underlying investment portfolio. Realistically, the in-
surer’s regulator would take over the entity and shield the policyholders. But 
this hardly improves the monitoring situation: the policyholders are saved, but 
the state insurance regulators are poorly placed to keep an eye on insurers’ af-
filiates’ derivatives risks day to day, much less to contain systemic risks to the 
American and world economies. 
Big banks, as custodians of the nation’s payments system, are the quintes-
sential systemically vital financial institutions. Lowering their counterparties’ 
risks raises the risks to depositors (and, eventually, to the depositors’ govern-
ment guarantor): if the bank lacks enough assets to pay off all of its creditors, 
the secured derivatives counterparties come first and the depositors second. Re-
tail depositors are poorly placed to monitor a commercial bank’s assets at all, 
much less understand and monitor a complex derivatives portfolio in the bank 
or an affiliate.48
 
 46. On opacity, see Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of 
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1036 (2007); and Simkovic, supra note 
 In the end, it’s again the regulator and government guarantor 
that count. 
13, at 
271-75. Although better disclosure is the usual cure, the derivatives book may be inherently 
opaque. See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of 
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis (Berkeley Cent. for Law, Bus. & the 
Econ., Paper No. 1585953, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1585953.  
 47. See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1187-89 (2010). The insurer would not reorganize under Chapter 11, 
but its holding company and affiliates typically would.  
 48. Commercial banks do not reorganize in Chapter 11, but their affiliates traditionally 
do. FDIC resolution procedures today would have treated the derivatives contracts of a failed 
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3. The United States of America as missing creditor  
The most important Code-induced mismatch of market-discipline incen-
tives and capacity is that coming from the United States as lender of last resort 
to the guaranteed and too-big-to-fail financial institutions. Compare the United 
States to the financially central firm’s derivatives counterparties. The national 
government is typically distant from the scene until a crisis arises, has diffuse 
incentives, can face difficulties in hiring those with the relevant expertise, and 
is often politically constrained from being aggressive. Often the market players 
themselves influence government policy in their immediate favor. None of this 
is to say that the United States is passive or unable to deal with a specific firm, 
particularly once the government is alerted to a problem. But it is poorly posi-
tioned to monitor risk successfully on a firm-by-firm, day-to-day basis. 
Moreover, even a fine regulator doesn’t want to do the job alone. With the 
superpriorities in place and with too many of the other creditors of core finan-
cial institutions passive and government guaranteed, the United States has 
every reason to want market players to have strong market-discipline incentives 
to monitor and ration risk. The United States should want parallel private moni-
tors with private incentives to do the job in tandem with the government. 
The United States can best control its exposure by better overall prudential 
regulation ex ante, including capital and portfolio rules, and by fixing the bank-
ruptcy rules so as to call forth more market discipline. Conceive of the Bank-
ruptcy Code adjustments I recommend as one effective way that a regulator 
who is also a guarantor adjusts to a market that puts a heavy risk load on the 
government’s shoulders. It harnesses the market. It incentivizes market disci-
pline in aid of regulatory finesse. 
4. The quandary of the bystander creditor  
The impediments facing traditional lenders here are serious. Consider the 
quandary of traditional lenders to the derivatives-heavy debtor. Their debtor 
has a large, hard-to-value component, namely its derivatives book. Its deriva-
tives counterparties are not overly concerned with their debtor’s financial sta-
bility, because they protect themselves with the debtor’s collateral, rather than 
with their understanding of the firm itself. In that setting, traditional lenders 
bear more risk but lack added capacity to understand the debtor’s complex un-
derlying condition because of the opacity of the debtor’s increasingly large de-
rivatives book. These traditional lenders need to compensate for their increased 
risk and their weakened capacity to assess that opaque risk. They hence have 
reason to substitute away from traditional financing and into the derivatives and 
repo components because they can best protect themselves via the Code’s fa-
vored treatment of derivatives and repos, without needing to understand their 
counterparty’s overall financial health well. A self-reinforcing engine can start 
up. 
By inducing complexity and opacity, the Code does not help the financial 
system. That is, if private parties absorbed the costs of complexity and opacity 
 
Citibank similarly to the way they’re treated for other counterparties under the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
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and still decided that the transaction is valuable, there’s little public reason to 
intervene. But here we have the oddity that the Code grants private players su-
perpriorities, but for private parties to obtain them, they must raise systemic 
costs by making the financial system more complex and more opaque. This is 
an unwise trade-off. 
To be sure, the payment priorities do not end all incentives for counterparty 
monitoring. In practice, many favored derivatives trades are not fully collatera-
lized. And the strong counterparty needs to know whether to demand more col-
lateral when its counterparty is moving out of the money. That induces the 
strong counterparty to pay attention both to the contract and to collateral value, 
which can be a window into the counterparty’s overall status. And some deriva-
tives, such as credit default swaps, have a “jump-to-default” quality, by which 
the contract can become suddenly valuable (such as when a reference entity de-
faults and a large sum becomes due); these contracts put the strong counterpar-
ty at risk if the contract value rises suddenly and simultaneously with the de-
cline of the weak counterparty’s overall value. 
Thus, while the situation is not black and white, and we lack empirical 
measures of most costs and benefits here, the incentives and directional push 
are clear: the Code reduces incentives for market discipline and increases in-
centives to use more of the Code-favored instruments. 
B. The Code-Induced Weakening of Market-Discipline Mechanisms 
Repeal of most superpriorities should make strong counterparties more vi-
vidly recognize that weak counterparties could fail. Strong counterparties 
should react with more rigorous market discipline by raising their prices, by re-
ducing their exposure to weak counterparties, by using less of what would then 
become less strongly favored financing channels, and by insisting that their 
counterparties’ financial structures be stronger. The changes are about what one 
should expect when eliminating a subsidy. 
1. Market discipline by counterparty monitoring  
Counterparty discipline could take several forms. The first is obvious and 
traditional: the strong counterparty watches the weak one’s financial state, stu-
dies its finances, and assesses its derivatives and repo exposure.  
True, a derivatives player’s capacity, like that of a traditional lender,49
 
 49. See supra Part II.A.4 (describing the quandary of the traditional lender). 
 to 
directly assess the other side’s overall value is diminished when the other side 
has an opaque, deep derivatives book. And economic theory suggests that firm-
by-firm monitoring is costly. Hence, while one should not overly rely on en-
hancing individualized counterparty monitoring capacity, the incentives issue is 
still crucial, as the incentives even for cheap monitoring, for better collective 
monitoring, and stronger overall market discipline are weak with superpriorities 
in place. 
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2.  By raising prices  
The second market mechanism is just as simple. Made to bear more risk, 
the stronger derivatives-trading players would have reason to raise their prices 
when trading with weaker ones. The raised prices would motivate the weak 
counterparties to be stronger, would lead trading to move to stronger counter-
parties, and would result in some trades not getting done—the derivatives mar-
ket would shrink once counterparty risks were fully priced and the implicit sub-
sidy removed. 
3. By dealing only with strong counterparties 
A third means of market discipline is also simple: the strong one only does 
business with well-capitalized counterparties. Some systemic financial weak-
ness in 2007 and 2008 emanated from the fact that investment banks, such as 
Lehman and Bear, had thin equity layers of only about 3% of their total as-
sets.50
Oftentimes centralized assessment of counterparty risk is most efficient. 
Incentivized market players may lack the skills to evaluate counterparty risk, 
but they would then have the incentives to support strengthened centralized rat-
ing agencies and better overall prudential regulation, both of which were weak 
during the run-up to the financial crisis.
 Incentivized counterparties could have insisted on only doing business 
with counterparties having, say, equity of at least 5% of assets.  
51
4. By reducing exposure to a single counterparty  
 
The derivatives market is strongly centralized, with five firms accounting 
for nearly 90% of the industry’s net credit exposure.52
The market’s existing extended setoff rights also militate toward market 
concentration. To get more value from the currently bestowed setoff and prefe-
rence rights, the derivatives dealer does better if it has its derivatives positions 
with a single counterparty than with many. Spreading the trades around to 
many counterparties would fritter away the extra value to derivatives players of 
the extended setoff. (If you have an unsecured in-the-money trade with A, and 
 But if Congress altered 
the Code so that the counterparties were made to bear more counterparty risk, 
stronger firms could have more reason to diversify their range of counterparties 
if some of the central parties were neither rock solid nor fully government 
guaranteed. There would be more players with a smaller stake in this financial 
market. 
 
 50. See, e.g., Bear Stearns Form 10-Q, supra note 4, at 5; Lehman Form 10-Q, supra 
note 43, at 5. 
 51. “It is now much more common [post-Lehman], according to [the head of asset ser-
vicing at Société Générale Securities Services], for a specialist provider to monitor the colla-
teral and provide full support to investors on the collateral process.” Heather Dale, Institu-
tions Focus on Counterparty Risk, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 2010, http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/0/7853d582-d877-11df-8e05-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1EHxX6CSV. 
 52. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON 
BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES (2009), available at http://www.occ.gov/     
topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/trading/derivatives/dq209.pdf.  
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an unsecured out-of-the-money trade with B, A’s failure does not allow you to 
net what A owes you against what you owe B. You will collect only in part 
from A, but must pay B in full. But if you had both trades with B, you could net 
the one you are obligated to pay on with the one you are ahead on, and thereby 
do better.) Setoff thereby encourages centralized, too-big-to-fail finance. 
5. By substituting into stronger financing structures 
Raising the expected private costs to the strong counterparties will press 
them to substitute away from risky instruments to more stable ones. Some subs-
titution would be done at the stronger counterparties’ insistence. Some could 
come via government prudential regulation, which the counterparties would be 
incentivized to support. And some substitution would come from the weaker 
party’s own incentive to strengthen itself to garner more business so that its 
stronger counterparties would lower their charges. The next Subparts outline in 
greater detail these mechanisms and incentives. 
6. By moving from overnight repos to longer-term financing  
Before it failed, a quarter of Bear’s assets came from repurchase agree-
ments that were regularly rolled over until Bear got into trouble.53
Because the Code’s priorities made these repos safer for Bear’s counterpar-
ties, the Code enabled Bear to substitute short-term hot money for safer longer-
term financing. A primary attraction for Bear’s overnight lenders was that the 
loans were less risky because they were favored financially by the Code’s su-
perpriorities, enabling those lenders to charge Bear a bit less than otherwise. 
Other parties—in the end, the United States of America—accordingly took 
more risk.  
 Lehman was 
similarly financed. These overnight sale and repurchase contracts were effec-
tively loans, with the difference between the repurchase price and the sale price 
as the interest rate.  
One could conceptualize Bear’s financing as a long-term, floating interest 
rate borrowing for one-quarter of its capital structure, with its lenders able to 
declare a default, accelerate their loans, and demand repayment on any day. 
Normally, a creditor accelerating such a loan cannot obtain immediate access to 
its collateral: the debtor files for Chapter 11 and the creditor, unlike the deriva-
tives and repos counterparties, is enjoined from immediately liquidating the 
collateral. Eventually the secured creditor is repaid, but the prospect of delay 
can make creditors wary of dealing with potential bankrupts.54
 
 53. See Bear Stearns Form 10-Q, supra note 
 
4, at 5.  
 54. Because time is money, if the interest rate paid for the delay is not the market rate, 
the ordinary secured creditor is hurt. The Code requires that the court adequately protect the 
secured creditor, but what courts consider adequate, financial markets can consider inade-
quate. 
Bear is said to have used collateral of decreasing quality over time, starting with trea-
sury securities and trading down to mortgage-backed securities, such as those famous from 
subprime lending. When the lower-quality securities were recognized as such, Bear’s coun-
terparties asked for higher-quality collateral, which Bear could only provide for a time.  
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If Congress raised counterparty risk for repos back up to the strong but in-
complete secured creditor levels, then counterparties to a future Bear would 
have more reason than Bear’s actual counterparties had in 2007 to want a stable 
counterparty. And firms like Bear would have more reason to keep themselves 
stable, because they could not so easily lower their cost of capital by using the 
overnight repo Code priorities. They might prefer to lower capital costs by hav-
ing more equity and a more stable base of liabilities. A more stable base of lia-
bilities would have more longer-term debt and less overnight hot money. Such 
shifts would make future financial failures less likely and, by making some key 
financial institutions more stable, also steady the financial system. 
Some substitution will be simple. If the strong counterparty bears more risk 
in the derivatives or repo transaction, it will charge more. As it charges more, it 
will sell less. 
7. By setting better margin coverage earlier 
Repo and derivatives counterparties are exempted from normal preference 
and fraudulent conveyance restrictions on eve-of-bankruptcy creditor collateral 
calls and repayment pressures. As such, sophisticated, aggressive creditors 
could decide that they can set the early collateral margins low, without much of 
a cushion, so as to capture the business. If trouble hits later, they know they can 
make strong collateral calls that are exempt from normal bankruptcy risk. They 
can capture more business by keeping the margin haircut low, and—our issue 
here—they do not face bankruptcy impediments from following this path.55
8. By discouraging knife’s-edge, systemically dangerous financing  
 
We can generalize. The Code’s superpriorities made the financial system 
less stable by subsidizing riskier borrower and lender behavior. With the repos 
golden under the Code, Bear and its lenders had reason to use them. With de-
rivatives players knowing that they enjoyed superpriority, they could pay less 
attention to one major cost of trading—the risk that their counterparty could fail 
and default on its obligations. By minimizing counterparty risk, the Code could 
well have magnetized this kind of financing, pulling financing away from sys-
temically better financing methods toward knife’s-edge, overnight repos. 
Bear’s history is consistent. In 1989, 6% of Bear’s capital structure was in 
Code-protected repos; in 1994, 11%; and, in 2008, 18%.56
 
 55. A good way to handle the inevitable valuation problems for eve-of-bankruptcy col-
lateral enhancements in the repo and derivatives markets is to analogize to inventory financ-
ing, which faces similar problems. The solution is to ignore changes in inventory levels in 
the ninety days prior to bankruptcy and to just assess whether the creditor was favored by an 
overall increase in inventory collateral over that period. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (2006); 
Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy, Banks, and Non-Bank Financial In-
stitutions (Feb. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 During that period, 
the Code’s benefits to derivatives and repos expanded greatly. 
 56. See Bear Stearns Form 10-Q, supra note 4, at 5; The Bear Stearns Cos., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K), at 181 (Sept. 28, 1994); THE BEAR STEARNS COS., 1989 SUMMARY 
ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1989). The numbers are net numbers, subtracting Bear’s repo assets 
from its repo liabilities.  
562 STANFORD LAW REVIEW Vol. 63:539 
C.  Runs and Contagion 
Proponents of priority pointed to contagion risk to justify to Congress their 
getting advantaged treatment: a failed firm that left its derivatives and repo 
counterparties unpaid would drag those otherwise healthy firms down too. Crit-
ics of that view have already shown that priority could also knock the weak-
but-not-yet-dead firm out as superpriorities encourage strong counterparties to 
grab the weaker firm’s assets quickly, inducing old-style bank runs.  
New thinking needs to be brought to bear as well. We now understand 
more about information contagion and collateral-value collapses than was un-
derstood when the original payment priorities entered the Code. I show next 
how new concepts of information and collateral contagion interact with the 
Bankruptcy Code deleteriously. 
1. The analytic bidding to date  
Regulators justly feared when the Code safe harbors first appeared that one 
financial failure could induce another and, like dominoes, the financial system 
could collapse. This fear justified treating derivatives and repos favorably. Less 
well understood when the Code was built, but now understood in academic 
analysis,57 was that the derivatives exceptions also increase the incentive of the 
failing firm’s derivatives counterparties to close out their positions, thereby in-
ducing financial failure. Indeed, in 2008 the Code’s superpriorities may well 
have pushed derivatives and repo creditors of failing financial firms to rush to 
cash in their claims and upgrade their collateral, which other creditors could not 
do.58
Just as banks with illiquid assets are vulnerable to massive, near-
simultaneous requests from depositors for cash, leveraged firms with illiquid 
assets are susceptible to runs. If creditors sense a weakened debtor, then strong, 
favored creditors have reason to rush the debtor to repay. By so pressuring the 
debtor, they may dismember a firm that was valuable intact or whose diminish-
ing value could have been better preserved if restructured. 
 
Bankruptcy preference and automatic stay rules can stymie such runs: a 
bankruptcy court can recall such repayments made to creditors in the ninety 
days before bankruptcy. This rule encourages the major financial creditors to 
 
One macro impact must be mentioned. Wall Street firms increasingly used mortgage-
backed securities to back up their prioritized repos, especially after the 2005 Code amend-
ments explicitly allowed them to do so and obtain the superpriorities. See Hördahl & King, 
supra note 23, at 37, 46. They were borrowing short term, often overnight, to finance what 
were, when one dug down deep enough, long-term, illiquid assets (housing and real estate). 
The Code thereby made it easier to borrow short term to invest long term, which is an un-
wise financial combination. When widespread, it makes the financial system riskier and po-
tentially less liquid. 
 57. E.g., Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy 
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 101 (2005); Partnoy & Skeel, 
supra note 46, at 1049; David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 1, 10-11 (2010). 
 58. A similar bankruptcy problem arises when higher-ranking creditors seek imme-
diate repayment in ways that can stop an otherwise viable firm from reorganizing. See 
THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7-19, 125 (1986). 
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negotiate contractual standstill agreements, under which each major creditor 
agrees not to pursue its remedies against the firm, so that a peaceful solution 
can be negotiated.  
Derivatives counterparties need not feel so encumbered under the Code be-
cause they are not restricted. The derivatives’ safe harbors from both preference 
law and the automatic stay incentivize the failing firm’s counterparties to start a 
run.59 If the failing firm is financially central, the safe harbors thereby raise 
systemic risk, as Franklin Edwards and Edward Morrison have shown.60
2.  AIG: collateral calls, runs, and private lenders’ refusal to lend 
  
The priorities hastened AIG’s failure. As AIG weakened, its counterparties 
demanded collateral from AIG, sapping it of liquidity.61
The Code’s core preference recovery concept is designed to reduce runs 
such as AIG’s.
 Chapter 11’s automat-
ic stay usually bars such collateral grabs, or its preference rules impede them, 
by pulling the grabbed collateral back into the bankrupt’s estate to benefit all 
creditors. 
62
True, given the low penalty on a preference violation—the preferred party 
has to return the preference, without more—preference law is not an imperme-
able barrier to runs.
 But the Code doesn’t apply its preference concept for one key 
class—derivatives counterparties—recreating the bankruptcy run problem. By 
omitting the preference concept for favored counterparties, the Code impedes 
firms like AIG from raising new money to stabilize themselves, as potential 
new investors want to wait until the run is over to see if enough value is left in 
the firm. 
63 Financiers subject to ordinary preference law have little 
reason to shun receiving preferences. But their incentives to actively seek pre-
ferred status are muted, and their incentives to agree to standstill while a deal is 
negotiated are raised, because their collection activity has a real chance of com-
ing to naught, as the preference could be called back in the resulting bankrupt-
cy. They are better incentivized to have a strong credit structure early on, be-
cause they lack the slack of being able to grab and keep eve-of-bankruptcy 
preferences. The derivatives counterparties’ incentives are not so tempered: if 
they can get paid, they’ll keep their eve-of-bankruptcy payments.64
 
 59. See Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
319 (2010); see also Duffie, supra note 
 
27, at 68-69; Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and 
Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 61 (2009). 
 60. Edwards & Morrison, supra note 57, at 101; see also Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 
46, at 1049. 
 61. See Stulz, supra note 9, at 64. 
 62. See JACKSON, supra note 58, at 125. 
 63. See Barry E. Adler, A Re-Examination of Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 576 (1995). 
 64. And for traditional lenders, actively seeking preferential payment can shade into 
conduct that induces courts to equitably subordinate not just the preferred payment, but the 
entire loan. See In re Am. Lumber Co., 7 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979). Presumably de-
rivatives players who position themselves to get the Code’s benefits will not be subordinated 
for doing so. See In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., 893 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990); In re W.T. 
Grant Co., 699 F.2d 599, 610 (2d Cir. 1983).  
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3.  Credit contagion  
Proponents of payment priorities via the safe harbors brought forward con-
tagion potential as a prime rationale. In this view, solvent counterparties be-
come unable to extract their frozen collateral from a failing firm and then they 
also fail, which in turn brings down their own counterparties. This fear of con-
tagion justified the Code’s derivatives priorities.65 The Federal Reserve, which 
itself directly deals in repos when implementing monetary policy and could be 
inconvenienced if unprotected by the superpriorities, pressed the contagion ar-
gument on Congress. It did so despite the fact that the Treasury Department had 
rejected the contagion rationale66
[P]arties [to repurchase agreements] do not merit better treatment under the 
Bankruptcy Code than any other party making a secured loan. . . . [T]he per-
ception of increased risk in the [repo] market is healthy, because it forces 
more responsibility in [repo] transactions by causing lenders to securities 
dealers to evaluate the financial condition of their borrowers, as creditors 
must . . . in every other type of secured lending transaction. There is absolute-
ly no likelihood of a government securities market breakdown from the effect 
of this discipline, as some have suggested, but rather an improvement in prac-
tices which will tend to prevent debacles . . . . 
 for market-discipline reasons that I see as 
correct and, in 1983, prescient:  
 . . . [W]e [at Treasury] do not support legislation to exempt [repos] from 
the judicial stay provided for by the Bankruptcy Code.67
Properly analyzed, superpriorities in a financial crisis could either stifle 
contagion or spread it.
 
68
4.  Information contagion  
 They spread it by allowing counterparties to drain the 
already-weak firm of cash, which flows into the bankruptcy-favored counter-
party. Which effect is more important is conceptually indeterminate, making 
contagion a poor theoretical rationale for superpriority. 
 Payment-priority backers focused on credit contagion: a failing firm first 
brings down its counterparty and then a row of financial dominoes follow. But 
 
 65. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 20 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
105 (“These provisions are intended to reduce ‘systemic risk’ in the banking system and fi-
nancial marketplace.”); 128 CONG. REC. 15,981 (1982) (statement of Sen. Dole) (“It is essen-
tial that stockbrokers . . . be protected from the issuance of a court . . . order which would 
stay the prompt litigation of an insolvent’s positions, because . . . the insolvency of one party 
could trigger a chain reaction of insolvencies . . . .”). Fear of contagion also motivated Con-
gress to expand the safe harbors. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 583, 583; 135 CONG. REC. S1414-15 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (statement of 
Sen. DeConcini); Philippe Jorion & Gaiyan Zhang, Credit Contagion from Counterparty 
Risk, 64 J. FIN. 2053 (2009). 
 66. Compare Letter from Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., to Senator Robert J. Dole, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Comm. on the Ju-
diciary (Sept. 29, 1982) (on file with author) (asserting that the automatic stay on repos 
would undermine systemic liquidity), with Letter from Roger W. Mehle, Assistant Sec’y of 
Domestic Fin., Dep’t of the Treasury, to Senator Robert J. Dole (Mar. 16, 1983), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1980/1982_0929_VolckerDoleT.pdf (stating 
to Congress that an automatic stay on repos posed no such threat).  
 67. Letter from Roger W. Mehle to Robert J. Dole, supra note 66.  
 68. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 57, at 94; Squire, supra note 47, at 1200. 
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that Code thinking fails to reflect fear of information contagion. This absence is 
a mistake, and even the eve-of-bankruptcy considerations for superpriority need 
to be updated and rethought. For information contagion, the Code’s impact is 
negative. 
Consider a setting where creditors are poorly informed about their counter-
parties’ financial health, because they, like many repo and derivatives players, 
rely more on collateral than on counterparty financial health. Because the 
Code’s superpriorities give them immediate access to the collateral, they assess 
their counterparty’s overall health less and their collateral value more. So, po-
sit that an unexpected economic shock tells them that their collateral is worth 
much less than they had originally thought, such as the sudden revaluation of 
the subprime mortgage market, which did occur and made holders of repos 
backed by subprime mortgages revalue their contracts. Surprised, they sudden-
ly call for better collateral and, when the debtor cannot post enough good colla-
teral, they must rely on counterparty financial quality more than they previous-
ly had expected. But they are poorly informed about counterparty overall 
financial quality, because, until the shock, the Code gave them less reason to 
pay attention to it.  
So when Bear, Lehman, and AIG failed, and the market repegged subprime 
mortgage collateral downward, creditors reevaluated their prior beliefs about 
the collateral they held from others and about their other counterparties’ sol-
vency. If they then had a deeper stock of direct information about their coun-
terparties’ overall strength, they might not have systematically repegged 
downward the quality of all counterparties. But the Code’s superpriorities gave 
them little incentive to acquire much counterparty-specific information in the 
ordinary course of business. They faced an informational black hole, toward 
which they wished not to draw any closer. Hence, they stopped lending until 
they could acquire better information about their counterparties. This suddenly 
made their counterparties more illiquid.69
This result is a panic, with lending markets freezing up. “A panic [occurs 
when] information-insensitive debt [suddenly] becomes information sensitive. 
It is a switch because it becomes profitable to produce private information 
about the debt,”
 
70
 
 69. See GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND 16-17, 48-49 (2010). For 
more on information contagion, see FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING 
FINANCIAL CRISES 260-95 (2007); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 
J. POL. ECON. 1 (2000); Brunnermeier, supra note 
 or to produce more information about the debtor. That de-
scription resembles American financial markets in September 2008. If the play-
ers had previously better assessed counterparty risk, they would not have been 
left as clueless about counterparty quality. Failures such as those of Bear, Leh-
man, or AIG would not necessarily have made the entire financial market re-
semble an informational black hole, because creditors would have had glim-
mers of understanding of the color, depth, and shape of the other financial 
players’ health. 
24; and Douglas W. Diamond & Raghu-
ram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Bank-
ing, 109 J. POL. ECON. 287 (2001).  
 70. GORTON, supra note 69, at 51. 
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5.  Collateral contagion  
The superpriorities facilitate a strong counterparty demanding better eve-
of-bankruptcy collateral from a weakened derivatives or repo counterparty. 
When many counterparties seek better collateral simultaneously, liquidate al-
ready-posted collateral, and thereby also induce their then-debtors to liquidate 
assets (to make the demanded collateral posts), the potential for a financial 
freeze-up is not small. The crisis of 2008 and 2009 partly stemmed from such a 
simultaneous effort across financial markets to sell collateral and debtor as-
sets.71
We thus now have reason to step beyond prior analyses that astutely indi-
cated that the Code cannot arrest credit contagion.
  
72
 
 Worse than being unable 
to arrest credit contagion, the Code here can exacerbate information and colla-
teral-value contagion. And in broad outline, the financial crisis suggests that it 
did both. 
*   *   * 
 
I have thus far emphasized the priorities’ systemic weakening of financial 
structures over the long term by undermining market discipline at the time of 
contracting. But even at the time of a financial crisis, the old anticontagion rai-
son d’être for superpriority is weak. Not only might superpriority exacerbate 
runs, as has been shown before, but it can exacerbate information contagion 
and collateral contagion, both of which were in play in the recent financial cri-
sis.  
III. WHY CONTRACT CANNOT SOLVE COUNTERPARTY RISK 
To summarize thus far: When one creditor’s risks in an enterprise decline, 
another’s rise. Once that other party understands it bears more risk, it should 
react by raising its interest rate, by seeking to reduce the risk it faces, or by im-
proving its contract terms. The risk transfer structure of the derivatives and re-
po priorities has not yet been examined in this vital dimension. But perceiving 
now that the derivatives counterparties’ lowered risk lowers their market-
 
71. See Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo 
(Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin. Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1440752; Antoine Martin, David Skeie & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Repo Runs 
(Eur. Banking Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 2010-13S, 2010), available at 
http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=103635; cf. Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy 
C. Stein, A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 6 
(2011) (“[W]hen Bank A takes on more [short-term] debt, it does not account for the fact 
that by doing so, it degrades the collateral value of any assets it holds in common with 
another Bank B—since in a crisis state of the world, A’s fire-selling of its assets lowers the 
liquidation value that B can realize for these same assets.”). 
The Dodd-Frank rules do better than bankruptcy in reducing collateral contagion. They 
do allow a brief stay, of one business day. That will not reduce collateral contagion much in 
itself. But during that time, the banking authorities can transfer the failed firm’s derivatives 
book elsewhere, thereby reducing rapid collateral liquidation. 
 72. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 57, at 94; Squire, supra note 47, at 1200. 
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discipline incentives is not enough, because it also raises other parties’ risk 
and, hence, raises their market-discipline incentives.  
However, a large slice of the default risk moves to parties that cannot, or 
will not, react contractually. Some are poorly positioned and too weakly in-
formed to monitor the debtor’s overall riskiness in general and its derivatives 
portfolio in particular.73 The new risk bearers are initially insurance policy-
holders, bank depositors, ordinary commercial paper buyers, and similar play-
ers who are often not well informed about the derivatives market. (To be sure 
here, the commercial paper and repo markets overlap. And the commercial pa-
per players ought to have learned from the financial crisis what risks they bear 
due to others having superpriorities.) This shift of risk applies regardless of 
where the firm’s risks come from;74
Modigliani and Miller demonstrated that varying a firm’s capital structure 
does not in itself reduce total risk, as that risk emanates from the firm’s opera-
tions.
 even if the increase in risk is coming from, 
say, the firm’s core operations, the derivatives and repo exceptions put more of 
that risk on the shoulders of the firm’s other creditors. 
75 If one financier reduces the risk it bears, another financier picks up that 
risk. Absent an explanation as to how and why manipulating capital structure 
affects the firm’s underlying operations and cash flows, risk is neither created 
nor destroyed, but can be shifted from one financier to another. Alan Schwartz, 
applying such thinking to secured credit, showed how secured credit reduces 
the risk borne by the secured creditor, but that risk moves to others who can 
price the risk unless they are tort claimants and similarly weak creditors.76 Lu-
cian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried showed with precision how the risk can be ineffi-
ciently moved onto the shoulders of nonadjusting contract creditors.77
The second and larger reason why contractual reaction fails for superpriori-
ty risk-shifting is that the creditor eventually bearing the bulk of the transferred 
risk is the United States as guarantor of too-big-to-fail firms. The United States 
cannot react contractually in any grounded sense of contract. Instead, it can 
react by changing the rules of the game to account for its weak monitoring po-
  
 
 73. See supra Part II.A.2-4.  
 74. While the conventional wisdom was that credit derivatives were central in bringing 
down AIG and others, some analysts show the centrality of the riskiness of AIG’s core port-
folio. See Squire, supra note 47, at 1183-87, 1203-04; cf. Viral V. Acharya et al., Manufac-
turing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 4 FOUND. & TRENDS 
FIN. 247 (2009) (describing excessive risk taking in large financial institutions). This view 
would extend the monitoring story: superpriorities reduced the incentives to monitor coun-
terparty risk, with that counterparty risk emanating from both the immediate derivatives 
trades and from the firm’s overall portfolio.  
 75. Modigliani & Miller, supra note 42. 
 76. Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current 
Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1, 3, 7-8, 11 n.28 (1981). Schwartz indicates that a normative 
solution to the tort risk transfer mismatch is to make the tort claimants prior in payment to 
the previously benefited creditors. The analogue for derivatives and repos would be to make 
the United States senior in all settings. 
 77. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of 
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996). 
On monitoring incentives and disincentives in general, compare Richard Squire, The 
Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 818-19 (2009), with Saul Lev-
more, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 56 
(1982). 
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sition. For the United States, changing the Code’s priority structure is how it 
would react quasi-contractually. 
A. Contractual Reaction and Its Limits 
1.  Financial covenants as partial solution  
Once burnt, twice shy. Ordinary creditors of financial firms in the future 
could take the debtor’s derivatives exposure into account. A simple way to do 
so would be to limit the total derivatives exposure by an appropriate formula 
embedded in the creditors’ loan agreements. This is common in other financial 
contracting: the lender lends, but requires that the debtor maintain a debt-to-
equity ratio of no more than, say, two dollars of debt for every dollar of equi-
ty.78
But derivatives counterparties can also react and, one expects, will do so. 
Some derivatives and repo counterparties did well due to their bankruptcy ben-
efits, but others did not anticipate the financial crisis and, hence, did not take 
full advantage of the privileges that the Code offers them. Lehman’s failure 
caught many derivatives counterparties short on collateral. In the next financial 
crisis, more counterparties will be prepared and, if the Code still permits them 
to do so, will demand collateral sooner, make sure that they can set off advan-
tageously, and demand repayments more quickly that would otherwise be void-
able transfers absent the exemptions. Postcrisis derivatives markets have al-
ready become more conscious of the import of managing collateral over 
managing counterparty risk.
 Derivatives could be folded into these kinds of financial contract cove-
nants. 
79 Contractual reaction may be an arms race going 
forward, for both the detrimentally affected creditors and the advantaged deriv-
atives players.80
 
 78. See AM. BAR FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 368-400 (1971). 
 
 79. See Chris Flood, Demand Rises for Collateral Solutions, FIN. TIMES (London), 
May 30, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57ca84ee-6a83-11df-b282-00144feab49a.html# 
axzz1DmcmVSVD (“Rapid growth in the use of derivatives has been matched by a ‘signifi-
cant increase’ in the demand for collateral management solutions, says Robert Coates of Vi-
teos Fund Services. But the extreme volatility of asset prices during the financial crisis and 
heightened concerns about counterparty risk means collateral management has become an 
operationally intensive task . . . .”). 
 80. Could disfavored counterparties grab collateral earlier and thereby put themselves 
outside the bankruptcy preference recovery period? Not really. While Goldman, if lacking a 
safe harbor, might try to grab collateral ninety-one days before it initially expects a bank-
ruptcy, cf. supra text accompanying notes 15-19, it cannot assuredly keep it. If the debtor 
filed more quickly, or were forced to file, Goldman’s prebankruptcy take would be recover-
able for the benefit of the bankrupt’s other creditors. The early seizing of collateral is typi-
cally a public event, warning other creditors, who can demand repayment or force an early 
bankruptcy. This turns the seizure of collateral into day seven before the debtor’s bankruptcy 
instead of day ninety-one. Goldman (if it lost its favored status) would be advised that credi-
tors would react thus to early seizure of collateral, and so would have less reason to seize an 
insolvent counterparty’s collateral and more reason to seek a collective remedy among credi-
tors. See JACKSON, supra note 58, at 7-19, 122-50. If the preference rules induce the creditor 
to act early when the debtor is solvent (when everyone can then be paid), they induce an effi-
cient early restructuring before the debtor deteriorates. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. 
Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1073 
(1995). Superpriorities undermine this beneficial impact.  
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2. The necessary incompleteness of contract: the United States as de 
facto guarantor  
Large financial institutions have a very large, passive creditor that does not 
act like an aggressive financial creditor with bond indenture covenants to en-
force. The United States is a de facto creditor, as it pays up to rescue guaran-
teed and too-big-to-fail financial institutions. Even if private parties adjusted to 
their borrowers’ derivatives and repo exposures, the derivatives market’s prime 
creditor—the U.S. Treasury—does not and cannot move nimbly in this dimen-
sion. Its equivalent to contractual adjustment for the fire next time is regulatory 
adjustment now.  
This is not a small point: private contractual reaction to the superpriorities 
is likely, now that financial players know the value of the priorities, but, be-
cause de facto the biggest creditor is the United States, contractual reaction will 
be unable to solve the major ex ante systemic problems. The United States as 
de facto creditor can only react by changing the regulatory framework, not by 
writing another clause into its bond indenture, because it has none. It is exposed 
and its conceptual equivalent to a bond indenture here is the panoply of finan-
cial regulation, including the Bankruptcy Code, which now largely, although 
indirectly, disfavors the United States.81
B. The Regulatory Reaction Needed 
 
The most sensible bankruptcy reform for the United States, as de facto gua-
rantor, is to cut back most superpriorities. 
1. Reshaping the Code’s safe harbors  
 The derivatives parties’ ability to seize collateral should largely be folded 
into the secured creditors’ strong but not all-encompassing power to do so. 
Strong counterparties would again be subject to ordinary preference and frau-
dulent conveyance law. The parties could continue to net or recoup obligations 
due to the bankrupt with those due from it, but not as automatically and only if 
the two are economically a single transaction. 
This does not mean that derivatives players would be thrown cold and 
naked into the street, unpaid. As long as the debtor is solvent, its creditors 
would be paid in full. That will better motivate the derivatives players to deal 
with strong, solvent debtors who remain solvent, but not with weak ones that 
may well become wards of the state. This is the core of the ex ante analytic 
perspective I bring to bear on the derivatives and repo problem. 
Second, some plain vanilla baseline derivatives transactions are not pref-
erences or fraudulent conveyances. The typical derivatives transaction has a 
party place initial margin with a strong counterparty. As the market moves in 
one or the other’s favor, the losing party posts variation margin. These ordi-
 
 81. For banks—AIG, Bear, and Lehman were not banks—FDIC resolution can treat 
failed commercial banks’ derivatives counterparties roughly as favorably as the Code does. 
See Michael H. Krimminger, Adjusting the Rules: What Bankruptcy Reform Will Mean for 
Financial Market Contracts, FDIC (Oct. 11, 2005), http://fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2005/ 
101105fyi.html.  
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nary-course posts correspond to actual, newly arising debts and do not present 
conceptual problems as either preference or fraudulent conveyances.82
The de facto priority problem is in how much further the Code goes. Dur-
ing the financial crisis, strong parties demanded more margin when they saw a 
weak counterparty. AIG originally had a AAA credit rating, without collateral-
posting obligations. But the counterparties’ contracts allowed them to demand 
collateral if AIG’s credit rating was downgraded, which they did. This is the 
kind of collateral demand from a newly weak firm that the Code usually seeks 
to deter via the preference recovery rules, § 547 and § 550. These transfers 
were conceptually preferential, but were safe from attack due to the superpriori-
ties. Such eve-of-bankruptcy collateral calls in derivatives and repo markets 
should be reclassified as nonexempt, voidable preferences. 
  
2. Justified exceptions for the derivatives and repo markets  
 While I analyze the overbroad nature of the priorities, not every payment 
priority lacks merit. I next point to three justified exceptions for derivatives and 
repos. 
Consider the netting rules. The Code allows a derivatives player to net its 
obligations to the bankrupt with obligations from the bankrupt. Netting can be 
valuable for the nonbankrupt counterparty even if the obligation to the bankrupt 
is identical in size to the obligation from the bankrupt. If the counterparty owes 
the bankrupt $100 million on one contract and is owed $100 million on another, 
the typical result, without netting, is that it must write a check to the bankrupt 
for $100 million, but it receives only a fractional return from the insolvent 
bankrupt. If the return to the bankrupt’s creditors is only ten cents on the dollar, 
a no-netting scenario yields the counterparty a $90 million loss. Netting gets it 
that extra $90 million. As between it and the debtor, this result is fair. But as 
between the counterparty and the debtor’s other creditors it may not be. If the 
bankrupt is a bailed out, financially central institution, the United States bears 
that $90 million loss. The local attractiveness of derivatives netting among fi-
nancially central firms is partly due to this risk transfer away from the firm and 
its creditors, to the United States. 
The derivatives industry had reason to want Congress to clarify that typi-
cal, basic swap contracts were integrated economically and should be treated as 
a single unit in bankruptcy. The derivatives players’ legitimate netting goal is 
to net two sides of an economically integrated single contract. Here’s why: A 
swap arrangement exchanges risk. One side promises, say, to pay LIBOR, the 
London Interbank Offered Rate, a benchmark interest rate that floats according 
to market conditions. The other side promises to pay a fixed rate of, say, 5%. 
(One side shuns the risks of interest rate changes, while the other side can bear 
them. So they trade.) An overly broad anti-netting rule could force the counter-
party to pay the full 5%, but only allow the counterparty to collect a fraction of 
the floating rate obligation from the insolvent debtor. But this trade was eco-
nomically a single contract, not two discrete deals. They should be netted and, 
even absent a Code safe harbor, ought to have been seen to be a single contract.  
 
 82. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2006). 
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But the Code again goes much further. It allows the counterparty to net un-
related trades, as long as they can be called derivatives or repurchase agree-
ments. And its scope has been so broad as to allow a party to net a winning po-
sition with the bankrupt against a losing contract (which the bankrupt would 
only pay fractionally) that the counterparty acquires after the debtor fails and is 
rolling toward bankruptcy. Such transactions are conceptually voidable pref-
erences. 
That is, strong counterparties have been able to net strategically, by acquir-
ing a flimsy obligation from the debtor and getting it de facto paid dollar for 
dollar by matching it with a nettable obligation to the debtor. Goldman and oth-
ers did this with the failing Bear Stearns. Said one trader: “My sharehold-
ers . . . said, ‘You’re . . . crazy. Why are you guys taking [such a] credit risk 
without making money?’ . . . [But] it just nets you down and offsets, because 
you’ve made your money on the other side of the trade.”83
Consider termination rights. Ordinarily the bankrupt debtor chooses 
whether to terminate or assume its prebankruptcy contracts. If it assumes, it is 
fully obligated to perform. If it terminates, it is liable to its counterparty. But 
the damages are rarely paid in full; they are paid pro rata in discounted “bank-
ruptcy dollars,” with the contracting party sharing the bankrupt estate with all 
of the bankrupt’s other creditors. 
 
The Code is generous, possibly overly so, to the bankrupt debtor in giving 
it so broad an option. But this rule reversal for derivatives players alone re-
quires justification. That justification could come from the chaotic consequence 
of having unclear, open-ended obligations for months after a Chapter 11 filing, 
as the bankrupt decides whether to assume or reject, paralyzing financial coun-
terparties. But industrial counterparties can also be severely damaged if the 
bankrupt takes its time deciding whether to assume or reject. Financial players 
have no monopoly here on inconvenience. Second, the Code could instead 
force the debtor to decide in short order whether to assume or reject.84 Third, a 
more neutral rule would terminate all contracts upon the filing of a bankruptcy, 
thereby disallowing either side from playing the market and cherry-picking to 
affirm profitable contracts while terminating losing ones.85
 
 83. COHAN, supra note 
 
12, at 30. As before, this is fair when the priority rule only af-
fects the two immediate players. But the risks keep moving and eventually reach the United 
States. 
Cutting back setoff will not be transactionally easy. Parties can rewrite unrelated con-
tracts into a single contract that blends otherwise unrelated bets into a single net amount due. 
To some extent, the standard master derivatives contract does this. 
 84. The debtor’s option also affected commercial lease markets. To reduce the deb-
tor’s optionality impact on lessors, Congress required that the debtor decide whether to as-
sume or reject within 120 days of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See H.R. REP. NO. 
109-31, pt. 1, at 86 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 153. The time frame could 
be tighter for financial contracts. 
 85. Thomas Jackson and David Skeel indicate that a properly drafted contract could 
readily reduce debtor cherry-picking under ordinary bankruptcy rules. Jackson & Skeel, su-
pra note 55, at 36-37. The derivatives lobby’s characterization of the threat may have been 
overblown.  
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IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS FROM COUNTERPARTIES 
Several strong and not-so-strong counterarguments to the analysis I have 
offered in this Article are relevant, but none is strong enough to reverse it.  
First, counterparties rely on the weak firm being too big to fail, regulatory 
proponents would say, making derivatives counterparties’ ranking in the 
Code’s priority structure unimportant. Changing the Code will not change out-
comes. Second, classic bankruptcy-based justifications for limiting creditors’ 
collateral seizures do not apply to derivatives and repos, some would argue, be-
cause the underlying asset is not connected to the bankrupt’s operation in the 
way that, say, the steel smelter is needed for the steel mill. Hence, the broad 
superpriorities are appropriate bankruptcy policy and should not be changed. 
Lastly, priority proponents would say that derivatives and repos are vital for the 
financial engineering needed to make today’s financial system work. Without 
priority, the financial system and end users will suffer. 
A. Would Repeal Change Derivatives Market Incentives? 
Critics of repeal might argue that strong counterparties expect the govern-
ment to bail out failed, weak counterparties. Accordingly, reducing the Code’s 
priority favoritism will not affect the strong parties’ expectations. They’ll ig-
nore counterparty risk regardless of the priority rules, because the government 
will always step in. 
However, firms are unlikely to fully rely on a government bailout. Lehman 
failed in 2008 when the Treasury let it go under; Drexel failed two decades ear-
lier. Governments say they will not bail out creditors next time. Although they 
often do not carry out their threats, there is genuine uncertainty about what the 
governments will do, because their actual strategy is mixed and hard to pre-
dict.86
Financial players’ actions indicate both that they are uncertain about what 
the United States will do and that they value superpriority. These players lob-
bied hard to get derivatives priorities extended in 1982, 1984, 1994, 2005, and 
2006, and to keep them in 2010. If they did not care about priority because they 
fully expected government bailouts, then they would not have lobbied for the 
superpriorities. If the probability of a government bailout is positive but uncer-
tain (i.e., not 100%) the analysis here applies. 
 Second, a financial firm may be failing but not be too big to fail. If re-
peal affects behavior and induces strong counterparties to diversify their coun-
terparties further, the increasing number of stronger counterparties will make 
each one less vital systemically. 
The derivatives and repo markets are said to be shocked when their priori-
ties are questioned.87
 
 86. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 20 (5th ed. 2005). 
 The repo market did grow more quickly as payments 
 87. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backwards, 
76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 565, 567-68 (2002) (“[Prior to the 2005 amendments, a court’s sugges-
tion that repos might be recharacterized as secured loans] sent shockwaves through the fi-
nancial industry . . . [because it placed] [b]illions of dollars in notional amounts of outstand-
ing repos . . . in danger of being labeled as security interests . . . .”); Simkovic, supra note 
13, at 282. 
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priorities were expanded, as Figure 2 illustrates, although it’s hard from that 
alone to conjecture the extent to which that would have happened without the 
priorities. Still, from 1981 until the financial crisis, the repo market grew twice 
as fast as did overall financial markets.88
 
 
FIGURE 2  
Growth in the Market for Repurchase Agreements and for All Financial Sector 
Debt, 1981-200989
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Second, consider the derivatives industry’s reaction to postcrisis congres-
sional and FDIC reform proposals that priority be limited to 90% of the rele-
vant debt. Reactions included: “Wall Street dealers are facing their worst 
fear,”90
 
 88. Total financial sector debt was twenty times larger at the end of 2006 than it was in 
1981, the first year available for repo data. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., supra note 
 and “Banks have warned that the provision . . . could have a chilling 
7, at 9. But the repo market grew more, to more than fifty times its 1981 
size. Much of the relatively greater growth was in the 2000-2007 period. Repo market in-
formation is from Statistical Supplement to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, BOARD 
GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/default.htm 
(last updated Jan. 28, 2011) (data available in Table 1.43 of each month’s bulletin); and U.S. 
Government Securities Dealers—Positions and Financing, FED. RES. ARCHIVAL SYS. FOR 
ECON. RES., http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/frb/page/31488 (last visited Feb. 17, 
2011). A slowing of repo growth in the 1980s is consistent with the view that court decisions 
unfavorable to priority affected the market, but this is hardly dispositive.  
  89. Financial sector debt information is from BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE 
SYS., supra note 7, at 9. Repo market information is from Statistical Supplement to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bulletin, supra note 88; and U.S. Government Securities Dealers—Positions 
and Financing, supra note 88. 
 90. Michael Mackenzie & Helen Thomas, Repo Dealers Fear Legislation Will Drain 
Liquidity, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 7, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c26678c2-e35a      
-11de-8d36-00144feab49a.html#axzz153BhFB1C. 
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effect on the ‘repo’ market and thus on broader credit availability.”91 One fi-
nancial player said: “The proposed legislation will certainly reduce leverage 
and liquidity in the repo market.”92 The chief executive of the Securities Indus-
try and Financial Markets Association was more vociferous, saying the propos-
al “would negatively affect the efficient operations of the credit markets, in-
creasing the cost of raising capital.”93 A spokesman for the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, an arm of the large derivatives dealers, wrote that 
without “close-out netting, it is questionable whether over-the-counter deriva-
tives—or repurchase agreements or clearing houses—would be viable.”94 
Leading academic defenders of the repo markets judge that without the bank-
ruptcy priorities the market would shrivel.95
“One head of repo [operations] at a leading bank was blunter, calling the 
proposed legislation, ‘nuclear’ for the market.”
 
96 The proposal’s congressional 
proponent, Brad Miller, indicated intuitions consistent with my thesis here. His 
proposal, he pointed out, would, if enacted, have “put[] pressure on anyone 
lending to a systemically significant firm to pay attention to what sort of shape 
the firm is in . . . . No one was paying attention to Lehman.”97
The derivatives industry takes these priorities seriously and does not rely 
on an assured government bailout for protection. 
 
 
*   *   * 
 
A similar counterview might be that derivatives and repo players would not 
substitute away into stronger, longer-term financing. One cannot be sure, but 
anecdotal indications support substitution. First are the industry’s own warn-
ings of dire consequences, as above. If they say their market may collapse if the 
superpriorities are weakened, then weakening superpriorities should lead 
the players to do less derivatives and repo business than they do now. Second, 
the repo market’s growth seemed to slow in the early 1980s, when a court deci-
sion98 left uncertain whether repos were subject to the automatic stay.99
 
 91. Tom Braithwaite & Michael Mackenzie, Creditors to Foot Bill in U.S. Risk Regu-
lation, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 2, 2009, 
 Third, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/558799be-df9c-11de   
-98ca-00144feab49a.html. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.; accord Cheyenne Hopkins, Creditors Fear New Resolution Process, AM. 
BANKER, Dec. 7, 2009, at 1. 
 94. David L. Mengle, Close-Out Netting and Risk Management in Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives 1 (June 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1619480. 
 95. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System 3 
(Oct. 18, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 
1676947 (“[T]he bankruptcy ‘safe harbor’ for repo has been a crucial feature in the growth 
of shadow banking . . . .”). 
 96. Mackenzie & Thomas, supra note 90. 
 97. Braithwaite & Mackenzie, supra note 91 (omission in original). Ex post haircuts 
are not a good way to strengthen market discipline.  
 98. In re Lombard-Wall Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 23 B.R. 165 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1982). 
 99. See Kenneth D. Garbade, The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 
1980s, FRBNY ECON. POL’Y REV., May 2006, at 27, 35-37; Carolyn Sissoko, The Legal 
Foundations of Financial Collapse 5-6 (Oct. 6, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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the growth in asset-backed repo securities has been said to depend on the avail-
ability of the Code’s superpriorities.100
A related comment: It’s tempting to imagine what would have happened if 
the superpriorities were not in place when AIG, Bear, and Lehman failed. One 
might mistakenly conclude that repealing the superpriorities would have no im-
pact, because in 2007 and 2008, superpriorities or no superpriorities, the firms 
were doomed. 
 Presumably denying the priorities 
would stifle or reverse their growth. 
That, though, is not the right way to consider the situation, as the ex ante 
incentives-based analysis I am pressing here indicates. Instead, imagine the im-
pact on the three failed firms’ capital structures if the superpriorities had not 
been in place for years before their failure. Would Bear and Lehman have been 
so heavily financed with risky overnight repos? Would AIG’s derivatives coun-
terparties have put so many derivatives eggs in the AIG basket? Would they 
have tolerated AIG’s risky portfolio overall? Would the derivatives and repo 
markets have been as large as they were? We need to imagine what the long-
term ex ante adjustment would have been. 
One would hardly say that bankruptcy priority alone generated the finan-
cial crisis or that fixing it is the silver bullet that will prevent future crises.    
Rather, it’s an important problem and one that is underanalyzed, underappre-
ciated in Congress, and readily remediable.  
B. The Unnecessary Asset?  
Classic justifications for the bankruptcy stay against creditors seizing secu-
rity, against preferences that shred the firm, and similar limits on creditors are 
these: The firm is often worth more held together rather than shredded, so the 
Code’s limits slow the shredding process down long enough for the judge and 
the parties to determine whether to reorganize the firm. The firm retains critical 
assets to maximize the total value of the bankrupt firm, and the affected credi-
tor is compensated for its loss.  
Is the collateral backing derivatives and repos that kind of vital asset? 
Maybe not. The bankrupt steel firm cannot continue its business without 
the steel smelter, so bankruptcy bars creditors with a security interest in the 
smelter from seizing the smelter while the Chapter 11 process runs its course. 
The Code protects those creditors, assuring them that they will eventually get 
full value, although not immediately.101
But if the asset that the counterparty seeks to seize is not analogous to the 
illiquid, difficult-to-value, difficult-to-substitute-for smelter, superpriority ad-
vocates might assert there’s no reason to stay such financial seizures. It’s not a 
  
 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1525120. Of course, extracting a trend from one event, espe-
cially one corresponding to a weak economy, is an interpretive indication, not proof. 
100. See Jennifer S. Taub, A Whiff of Repo 105, BASELINE SCENARIO (Mar. 16, 2010), 
http://www.baselinescenario.com/2010/03/16/a-whiff-of-repo-105 (former Fidelity legal 
official tying priority structure to repo market growth). 
101. Creditors often conclude that they are not getting full financial value, but the 
theory is clear: keep the asset in the firm, reorganize, and then pay the affected creditor in 
full. 
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critically interconnected factory that fits tightly and of necessity with the bank-
rupt’s other operations.102
This argument is strong for an industrial firm. The cash-strapped firm 
could be made to show its longer-term survivability; if it’s viable, it should be 
able to refinance itself in a good financial market with the new lender priorities 
that the Code allows.
 Cash is generic; a steel mill is not. 
103
Although strong for an industrial firm, the unnecessary-asset view is weak 
for a financial firm, which needs the very liquidity that superpriorities damage. 
The failing financial firm’s liquidity via its cash and near-cash assets can be as 
critical for its survival as the smelter is for the steel manufacturer. How far one 
should go here is open to debate, and allowing the bankrupt unimpeded access 
to cash collateral would be strong medicine. But if derivatives and repo coun-
terparties seize enough value from the failing firm, the financial firm is sapped 
of liquidity. Dried out, it cannot operate. It dies.
 (If this were the main counterpoint here, more would 
need to be said.) 
104
Another way to think of this defense of superpriority is that the automatic 
stay need not apply to assets unrelated to a debtor’s operation if there’s a well-
functioning credit market. A new loan can substitute for cash but not for a cus-
tomized, difficult-to-value smelter. But in the financial crisis we experienced in 
2008, there was no functioning credit market, a situation that made financial 
firms’ ability to retain liquid assets as potentially important to their survival as 
retaining unique operating assets is for the industrial firm. Thus the classic jus-
tification for the stay and for preference law extends to derivatives and repo 
contracts for the financial firm. (I add this view here for completeness. Which 
way one comes out on the issue is not critical: even if the financial asset is un-
necessary to the financial firm’s operations, we would need to trade off be-
tween releasing the unnecessary asset ex post with the need for better ex ante 
market discipline. The latter now seems more important than the former.)  
 
Lastly, the liquidity-as-financial-firm-asset concept interacts with the bank-
ruptcy stay and with runs in another dimension, as we saw above. Assets, typi-
cally financial assets, back derivatives and repos. When a counterparty can se-
ize and sell the asset of a defaulting player, it can quickly exit its contract. 
When many counterparties seek to liquidate similar underlying assets at the 
same time, the potential for a financial gridlock increases.105
[S]hort-term repos had always been regarded as virtually risk-free instru-
ments . . . . In March [2008], . . . repo markets [were] severely disrupted when 
investors believe[d] they might need to sell the underlying collateral in illiquid 
markets. Such forced asset sales can set up a particularly adverse dynamic, in 
 Consider Ben 
Bernanke’s statement: 
 
 102. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 57, at 114.  
 103. See 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006). 
 104. Cf. Mark Carey & René M. Stulz, Introduction to THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 1, 6 (Mark Carey & René M. Stulz eds., 2006) (“[R]isk management is unique-
ly important for financial institutions because, in contrast to firms in other industries, their 
liabilities are a source of wealth creation for their shareholders. For instance, a financial in-
stitution that writes long-dated derivatives would usually be shut out of the market if the cre-
dit rating of the vehicle it uses to write such derivatives fell below an A rating. . . . [A finan-
cial institution’s] franchise value depends on the risk of its insolvency . . . .”). 
105. See sources cited supra note 71. 
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which further substantial price declines fan investor concerns about counter-
party credit risk, which then feed back in the form of intensifying funding 
pressures.106
The bankruptcy’s automatic stay could dampen a financial crisis, because the 
stay would have reduced simultaneous asset grabs and asset sales. 
 
C. Financial Necessity: Are Derivatives and Repos Like Banking?  
Policymakers may, and the derivatives industry surely will, argue that the 
derivatives industry requires priority in order to work. Repurchase agreements 
and derivatives enhance liquidity and risk management, and liquidity and risk 
management are important for the economy. Just look at the depth of securities 
firms’ financing via repos and the wide use of credit derivatives to control risk. 
If Congress denies them their Code-based advantages, it will damage the econ-
omy’s financial arteries. 
The problem is not that many derivatives and repos fail to provide real 
benefits. The problem is that there’s no reason, on that assertion of importance 
alone, to favor derivatives and repos over other financial contracts. Restaurants 
need food deliveries to survive, and people need to eat food. Steel mills need 
iron, coal, and cobalt to make steel; the steel industry is economically important 
and hence priority for deliveries, their iron suppliers might say, is vital. Bor-
rowers need capital; firms need labor. Firms need telecommunications. These 
are true statements about the economic importance of food, steel, iron, lending, 
working, and the telephone, but that vitality alone does not justify priority for 
food deliveries to restaurants and for iron deliveries to steel mills. They all de-
serve priority. But when the debtor lacks sufficient value to pay all its creditors, 
they cannot all have it. Each transaction needs to stand on its own. If repos and 
derivatives are privately valuable, people will pay for them. For now, we sub-
sidize them. 
Many economic and financial transactions are beneficial and some are es-
sential. But saying so does not justify prioritizing and subsidizing one side or 
the other of the trading relationship over the counterparties’ other creditors and 
trading partners, whose trades also benefit the economy. 
Priority transfers risk to other players who also provide economic benefits. 
Those transfers and subsidies are hidden and, when widespread, pernicious. 
Congress would need to be convinced that repos and derivatives provide 
some critical benefit with spillover effects. It’s the extra benefit from positive 
spillovers that would justify jumping such financial contracts to the head of the 
bankruptcy queue. But to state their potential for spillover benefits is to state 
their costs: we may have overused these financial products, due to their favored 
bankruptcy status, thereby exacerbating a financial crisis and knife’s-edge fi-
nancing. From what we now know, spillovers are at least as likely to be nega-
tive as positive. In the absence of compelling evidence either way, policy 
 
106. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks to the Risk Transfer Me-
chanisms and Financial Stability Workshop (May 29, 2008) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080513.htm). 
578 STANFORD LAW REVIEW Vol. 63:539 
should be neutral. Derivatives should be treated like other financial obliga-
tions.107
 
 
*   *   * 
 
Consider another financial necessity argument: Derivatives and repos have 
become so fundamental to American financial markets that they resemble the 
bank payments system in their foundational necessity. Just as check-clearing 
and savings activities should be safe and fully transparent so that depositors 
need not fear bank failure, for Wall Street to function in the twenty-first cen-
tury, it needs repos, and both Main Street and Wall Street now need credit de-
rivatives to manage risk. These instruments are vital for finance, this view 
would have it, and players using them need additional protection because they 
cannot be concerned with their counterparties’ creditworthiness. 
Two caveats, both substantial, militate here against such favoritism. First, 
the derivatives and repo markets are not widely populated by financially naïve 
retail bank depositors. Rather, the center consists of sophisticated financial 
players.  
Second, if derivatives and repos resembled the payments system in needing 
protection and transparency due to their systemic importance, the proper regu-
latory reaction would not at all be ad hoc bankruptcy priorities. Rather, Con-
gress would need to complete the regulatory and contractual loop by recogniz-
ing that the United States is that market’s missing creditor and that the United 
States needs to complete its contingent, de facto contract status with a regulato-
ry structure that approximates that which we use for deposit banking. There 
would be greater risk controls and regulation. The derivatives and repo players 
would be charged for the government guarantees. We now get the costs of fa-
voring derivatives, but without the full panoply of benefits and controls.108
I am not arguing that derivatives and repos have systemic benefits at the 
level of bank deposits. But if this view is given weight in Congress, the appro-
priate reaction is a regulatory overlay that recognizes systemic value, regulates 
the resulting risk, and charges the derivatives market for the government sup-
port, not an ad hoc set of bankruptcy superpriorities. 
 
D. Preserving Priority 
Collateralized derivatives, special purpose vehicles,109
 
107. Solely focusing on the safe harbor’s extra benefits to the derivatives and repo 
players is itself not logically entailed here. If serious systemic costs emanated from ordinary 
treatment of derivatives, and did so without offsetting benefits, then the logic of incentives 
and systemic risk would point us to considering cutting back ordinary treatment. 
 secured credit, and 
unsecured senior debt all lie on a spectrum of priority in bankruptcy. Several of 
the reasons to doubt the overall public economic value of derivatives’ priorities 
apply to these other types of financing, albeit not the major reasons. We need 
108. Cf. Morgan Ricks, Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation 1, 27 (Aug. 30, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/paper=1571290. 
109. A special purpose vehicle is a separately incorporated firm, structured to be diffi-
cult to enter Chapter 11 (hence, they’re often called “bankruptcy remote”), into which a firm 
moves assets for the purpose of financing itself. 
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not abandon the spectrum altogether, but we should examine the justifications 
for elevating derivatives and repos to the high end of that spectrum. Thus far, 
only derivatives priorities have made the United States a major de facto creditor 
and guarantor of the derivatives firms. And, thus far, only derivatives priorities 
have exacerbated a major financial crisis and economic downturn. 
True, the affected financial players might react to repeal by constructing 
separate bankruptcy-remote vehicles.110 The new vehicles would be affiliated 
with the core financial institution, but allow their creditors to seize value from 
the separate entities if the core firm fails. Such bankruptcy-remote special pur-
pose vehicles are widely used elsewhere.111
The financial industry has relied on the safe harbor priorities, convinced 
Congress to expand those priorities, and did not see fit to rely heavily on using 
such bankruptcy-remote affiliates for derivatives trading. If the safe harbor 
priorities were cut back, the industry, I hope, would substitute toward safer fi-
nancing, and that could include well-capitalized bankruptcy-remote vehicles 
that do not put the core financial institution’s capital at risk. Indeed, requiring 
affiliates to handle all derivatives trading was a regulatory proposal that the de-
rivatives-trading banks vociferously opposed,
 But removing the derivatives book 
from the core financial institution differs sharply from the usual bankruptcy-
remote issue of the debtor creating a firm with priority over its other creditors 
because the separate vehicle gets especially “good” assets. Removal pushes the 
derivatives book out from the systemically vital institution to a separate affili-
ate. By pushing it out, market players would be removing the derivatives risks 
from having a call on the financially sensitive bank’s equity and, hence, from 
having a call on the government’s guarantee. This is the public policy goal we 
should be seeking.  
112 presumably because counter-
parties want access to the government-guaranteed institution and the bank’s 
capital to back up the obligations. Partial separation became part of the Dodd-
Frank bill as passed.113
 
110. See Kenneth Ayotte & Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits of 
“Bankruptcy Remoteness,” REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-2), available at 
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/09/13/rfs.hhq059.full. 
 
 111. Again, bankruptcy-remote affiliates are companies that hold the target assets and 
are kept separate from the core company. Even if the core company goes bankrupt, the affili-
ate should not. It would thereby pay its debts outside of the core firm’s bankruptcy. 
112. See Wall Street Transparency & Accountability Act of 2010, S. 3217, 111th Cong. 
(as reported by S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, & Forestry, 2010), available at 
http://ag.senate.gov/site/legislation.html; Scott Patterson & Robin Sidel, Finance-Bill Pro-
posal Worries Banks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010, at A4; Edward Wyatt, Veto Threat Raised 
over Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at B1 (“The measure would . . . require banks 
and Wall Street firms to spin off much of their derivatives operations into a separate subsidi-
ary . . . . Financial institutions will fight that provision vigorously.”). 
113. A third and further analytic issue is the application of differing rules: the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act applies to commercial banks, while the Code applies to investment 
banks. But the FDIC priority and safe harbor rules are analogous to the Code rules, as the 
derivatives industry sought and obtained parallel safe harbors in the Code and under banking 
regulation. Changes should occur in parallel fashion. 
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E. Transition 
Regulatory transition is a related issue. Although derivatives and repos do 
not merit regulatory subsidy, they are financially important in the markets that 
we have now, partly because the Code subsidizes them. Any transition should 
not be abrupt, so that markets can smoothly adjust. 
 Also, transition will not be easy politically. Incumbent groups benefit from 
the superpriorities, know what they are, and will oppose reform, a characteristic 
that often stymies change.114
Moreover, change is costly and the rules in place, even if unwise when 
enacted, will impose costs as well as benefits if changed.
 It’s unclear from where lobbying for change 
would come. Some explanation for the existing superpriorities must come from 
the lobbying power of the benefited financial institutions. The arguments 
against the superpriorities are substantial, but neither self-evident nor amenable 
to political and media sound bites, making interest group lobbying potential 
here strong. 
115
F. Extent 
 The day-to-day 
transactional world of finance relies today on using derivatives and repos in 
many settings and will seek to keep that world, either by resisting rule changes 
or by creating close substitutes if the rules change anyway. But if the close 
substitutes do not present systemic risk, they are better than the current ar-
rangements, as I indicated in the prior Subpart. 
The market-discipline disincentives warn us to be wary of the Code’s su-
perpriorities for derivatives and repos, and these priorities and safe harbors 
need to be limited. The Code’s exceptions transfer risk from one of the finan-
cial firms’ creditors to another, with those risks eventually ending up in the 
hands of the United States. The United States needs to react like a contractual 
creditor would, but, lacking a contract, it must use its regulatory tools, such as 
the Code.  
But not all derivatives contracts involve systemically vital institutions that 
push risk onto the United States. One counterargument is that any rollback 
should not affect, say, industrial end users of derivatives. Rolling back the 
Code might be best implemented technically by across-the-board application, 
or by targeting a rollback to systemically vital financial firms but not ordinary 
financial and industrial firms; I offer here no justification as to where, or 
whether, to draw the line. If only for political expediency, industrial end users 
outside of the financial core may have to be exempt (i.e., with their counterpar-
ties retaining superpriority), although this tweak to cutback carries some politi-
 
114. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 641, 652 (1996); Enrico Perotti & Paolo Volpin, Lobbying on Entry (Eur. Fin. Ass’n 
2004 Maastricht Meetings, Paper No. 2277, 2004), available at http://www.ssrn.com/       
abstract=558588. 
115. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Cor-
porate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999). 
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cal risk that the financially central firms will use the end users as a wedge to 
defeat any rollback.116
V. WHAT THE DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL REFORMS DO AND FAIL TO DO 
 
A. Dodd-Frank: Nothing on Bankruptcy Superpriorities 
Congress recently passed a major financial overhaul, the Dodd-Frank 
Act.117 It did not change bankruptcy priorities. It does mandate that derivatives 
trading be pushed out from the insured institution via the so-called Volcker 
rule, which seeks to stymie banks’ proprietary derivatives trading.118
Dodd-Frank provides for a nonbankruptcy liquidation mechanism for sys-
temically important financial institutions.
 Whether 
these provisions can be effectively implemented is yet to be seen.  
119 The FDIC can restructure the 
failed entity and move its assets and liabilities out from the failed entity. Be-
cause each creditor entitlement ties to the Bankruptcy Code, the Code is poten-
tially still central formally.120
B. A Derivatives Exchange: Many Eggs, One Basket 
 As importantly, Dodd-Frank contemplates a 
resolution procedure likely to put the derivatives players in about the same po-
sition as the Code puts them: there is an automatic stay of sorts in Dodd-Frank 
for financially central firms—but only for one business day. During that busi-
ness day, the financial regulators are expected to arrange for the transfer from 
the failed institution of its entire derivatives book; they cannot cherry-pick 
among a counterparty’s contracts with the debtor. That is, the stay allows the 
regulator to find a party that will pick up the derivatives book, which may well 
effectively cover the unsecured portion of the derivatives book. While the one-
day Dodd-Frank stay is more onerous than the Code’s lack of any stay, the ex-
pectation of the regulator making good on the unsecured portion of the failed 
firm’s derivatives book is better. If the regulator fails to transfer the book in 
one business day, the automatic stay lifts. 
The major derivatives safety initiative in Dodd-Frank is to mandate a clear-
inghouse or exchange for many derivatives.121
 
 116. Cf. A Financial Reform Reprieve, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2010, at A18 (identifying 
companies such as Alcoa, Boeing, Caterpillar, Disney, and Procter & Gamble that lobbied to 
be exempt from derivatives regulation). 
 The clearinghouse would 
promptly call for new collateral if the value of the derivative contract declines. 
117. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
118. Whether it will succeed is disputed. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Despite 
Reform, Banks Have Room for Risky Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2010, at A1 (describing 
loopholes). 
119. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 201-217, 124 Stat. at 1442-520 (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394). 
120. See Dodd-Frank Act § 210(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 1477 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5390(b)(4)(B)). Dodd-Frank affirms the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s power to 
repudiate contracts, including derivatives contracts, as long as it does so in a reasonable pe-
riod of time and pays damages. 
121. See Dodd-Frank Act § 725, 124 Stat. at 1685 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a-1). 
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It would also make trading more transparent in ways regulators could better 
monitor. 
While a clearinghouse can be useful in important dimensions, it is unlikely 
to be anywhere near as helpful as the consensus in Washington came to believe 
during the reform discussions.122 Deep weaknesses afflict the clearinghouse, 
making it unwise to rely on it primarily, as Dodd-Frank has. First, it’s unclear 
whether the exchange would itself be properly incentivized to handle counter-
party risk, particularly if the major derivatives dealers themselves control the 
clearinghouse.123
Second, many types of derivatives just cannot be handled by a clearing-
house, because there’s no market price against which the clearinghouse em-
ployees can mark the cleared but open transaction. Worse, one major class of 
derivatives—credit default swaps—face “jump-to-default” risk. They look fine 
until the underlying security has a credit event and a huge payment is due. Col-
lateralizing these on an exchange or clearinghouse has proven to be difficult 
thus far, and no easy solution is available. 
  
Third, and insidiously, a clearinghouse is a very large netting organization. 
It reduces risk for the participants and can enhance transparency in these finan-
cial markets. The risks netted do not disappear, but are borne by the creditors 
outside the exchange’s netting mechanisms. If the only systemically important 
risks are those netted inside the exchange, fine. But if systemically important 
firms are outside the exchange, they bear more risk due to the exchange, and 
we accordingly might not reduce systemic risk enough. 
Fourth, and even more insidiously, a clearinghouse ups the ante on “too big 
to fail,” because the clearinghouse will itself be too big to fail. That’s fine, but 
only if it doesn’t fail. Recall though that fast-moving Russian exchange rates 
brought down Long-Term Capital Management and its Nobel Prize-winning 
managers. And fast-moving revaluations of subprime assets in 2008 may have 
moved faster than a clearinghouse would have been able to react to. If the clea-
ringhouse can run as fast as a fast-moving market, we’re safe; if it can’t, we’re 
not.124
 
 122. On Washington’s postcrisis infatuation with clearinghouses, see COMM. ON 
CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 
 
13, at iii-iv; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 7 (2009); Gary Gensler, How to Stop Another Derivatives 
Inferno, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3b52b642-217c-
11df-830e-00144feab49a.html (chair of the derivatives market’s primary regulator touting 
capital requirements, transparency, and clearinghouses); and Michael Mackenzie, Aline Van 
Duyn & Hal Weitzman, Derivatives Dealers Brace for Clearing Shake-Up, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), July 13, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/019f8048-8e9a-11df-8a67-00144feab49a 
.html (“After Bear Stearns and then Lehman in 2008, clearing became a priority for regula-
tors.”). 
123. See ROBERT E. LITAN, THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS’ CLUB AND DERIVATIVES 
MARKETS REFORM 9, 11, 28-29 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
Files/rc/papers/2010/0407_derivatives_litan/0407_derivatives_litan.pdf. 
124. See Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, 
Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 
(Jan. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract/paper= 
1340660; see also Stulz, supra note 18, at 82, 88-89; Mark J. Roe, Derivatives Clearing-
houses Are No Magic Bullet, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2010, at A19; Jeremy C. Kress, Credit De-
fault Swap Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk (Apr. 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/paper=1583912. The clearinghouse also does not address the 
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CONCLUSION 
Chapter 11 typically bars creditors from collecting on their loans from the 
bankrupt debtor, requires that creditors who preferentially seize security or get 
themselves repaid on the eve of bankruptcy return the assets seized or the re-
payment made, requires that fraudulent conveyances be recaptured by the debt-
or, and allows the debtor, but not the creditor, to affirm or reject outstanding 
contracts. 
None of these rules apply to a bankrupt’s derivatives and repo counterpar-
ties. Instead, derivatives and repo players can seize collateral, more widely net 
out gains and losses on open contracts, terminate contracts, and keep eve-of-
bankruptcy preference payments from the debtor that favor them over other 
creditors. Their privileged capacity to jump the queue can induce a run on the 
failing financial institution, and such a run may have hit AIG, Bear Stearns, and 
Lehman, deepening and extending the recent financial crisis. Worse, their ex-
emptions from basic bankruptcy practice can exacerbate collateral contagion 
and information contagion. 
The systemic issues need to be analyzed in two time periods: once, for an 
ongoing financial crisis, and again for the years prior to the crisis. As we’ve 
seen, the impact during an ongoing crisis is indeterminate, with benefits (reduc-
ing contagion) and costs (runs, information contagion, and collateral conta-
gion). But, the most severe bankruptcy derivatives problem is the one I’ve 
brought forward to analyze in this Article: the derivatives players’ advantages 
undermine prebankruptcy market-discipline incentives in the years before a cri-
sis in ways that, once a crisis hits, accelerate and transmit financial instability 
originating elsewhere in the financial system. That acceleration stems from the 
limited incentives of most derivatives counterparties to monitor the prebank-
ruptcy debtor, to price and absorb the systemic risk, to diversify their counter-
parties, and to strongly insist on counterparties being well capitalized, since the 
derivatives and repo players do well in a resulting bankruptcy. Once they know 
they can seize the collateral, they monitor the collateral, not primarily the cred-
itworthiness of the counterparty. Once they know they can obtain eve-of-
bankruptcy collateral free from preference attack, they have less reason to wor-
ry early about overall counterparty risk than do less privileged creditors. Al-
though ordinary financial creditors of the debtor see their incentives for market 
discipline vis-à-vis the debtor rise correspondingly, too many have only limited 
capacity to discipline the debtor, as often they are not well informed about that 
market.  
 
knife’s-edge financing issues for repos. (Repos do not go through a clearinghouse, although 
triparty repo, which inserts a dealer between buyer and seller, has similarities. See Garbade, 
supra note 99, at 38-39.) 
The clearinghouse, however, has one undiscussed systemic advantage if superpriorities 
persist. The superpriorities’ wide setoff right supports a concentrated derivatives market, be-
cause concentrated counterparties with many offsetting trades between them better capture 
the value of extended setoff than do decentralized traders with many counterparties. See su-
pra Part II.B.4. The clearinghouse internalizes this setoff advantage in the clearinghouse, 
allowing for smaller players to indirectly get some of the Code-bestowed setoff benefit. 
However, the clearinghouse may itself then also pick up much, or all, of the systemic too-
big-to-fail quality now adhering to major derivatives players. 
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Still, even poorly informed creditors’ contractual reaction could eventually 
reduce these problems, because in time unsecured general creditors such as 
those in the commercial paper market will anticipate the generality that they are 
bearing more risk, especially after they’ve suffered or seen others suffer. But 
the biggest unsecured creditor for financially central firms like AIG, Bear, and 
Lehman is the United States, as de facto guarantor of too-big-to-fail financial 
institutions. For the United States, localized contractual reaction is implausible, 
since it has no contract. Instead, regulatory reaction that motivates more market 
discipline is needed.  
Like the mortgage-interest deduction for home ownership and our long-
lasting farm subsidies, we are subsidizing the production of derivatives and re-
pos via the Code’s favored treatment. When we subsidize an activity, we get 
more of it than we otherwise would. Worse, as economic and financial activity 
gravitates to the favored sector, the sector becomes more important to the 
economy, making change hard because it would disrupt ongoing ways of doing 
business. We also get vested interests who have much reason to resist change 
and to bring forth arguments and resources against that change. 
Congress should repeal or reshape the de facto derivatives priorities in 
Chapter 11. A long phase-in of repeal would be needed. And, while clarifica-
tions are appropriate, such as affirming the integrated nature of an interest rate 
swap as not comprising two separate contracts for bankruptcy purposes, the de-
rivatives superpriorities are far too strong, going much further than simple, 
principled clarifications. Although it would be better if we had good data on the 
magnitude of benefits and costs, without that data we must analyze incentives 
and make judgments as to likely reactions to changed rules. Repeal would push 
derivatives and repo counterparties to insist on doing business with safer deb-
tors, would induce them to charge for the extra risk, and would help to stabilize 
the financial system. As weak debtors saw the costs of their repo financing and 
derivatives transactions rising, they would feel pressed to substitute toward 
longer-term, more stable financing.  
My point is not that private market discipline is without qualification supe-
rior across-the-board to good, direct prudential regulation. We do not want to 
substitute private discipline for better public risk regulation via, say, stronger 
capital requirements. Rather, the point is that prudential regulation will be im-
perfect, because of the standard debilities of government actors and because of 
the potential for capture by the regulated. Indeed, some of the Code’s super-
priority rules now in place may represent that sort of capture. Given the debili-
ties of prudential regulation, public efforts should be structured, if the political-
economy impediments to do so can be overcome, to add as much efficacious, 
cost-effective market discipline to the mix as we can. 
The blanket exceptions and superpriorities for the derivatives and repo 
markets are overly broad and can let counterparties drop their guard. Given that 
some ex post government bailout and resolution is unavoidable, we want a 
bankruptcy system that encourages as much market-based, ex ante market dis-
cipline as can be had, via more market-based counterparty monitoring, better 
risk pricing, and more resilient financial structures. The Dodd-Frank financial 
reforms give the regulators significant resolution authority in a financial crisis. 
But they fail to harness private incentives for precrisis financial market discip-
line. We need to have both. 
 585 
Risk-free investments with superior bankruptcy priorities have major effi-
ciency potential, by creating a superpriority investment channel that lowers in-
formation and negotiation costs for lender and borrower. But the priorities now 
come packaged with systemically dangerous government backing, because sys-
temically central institutions heavily use the bankruptcy-safe package. When 
systemically central institutions use the priorities, the superpriorities’ private 
advantages—such as saving on the costs of market discipline—are the very fea-
tures that worsen systemic problems. 
If Congress could separate the plainly efficient flows from those flows that 
are also systemically dangerous—and then restrict only the latter—it could im-
prove the financial system in both dimensions. But if it cannot separate them 
for two-dimensional improvement, we need to choose between the two. We 
now know that the systemic costs of superpriority are very high and, to contain 
those costs going forward, we need to better harness market discipline in the 
derivatives and repo markets. To do so, Congress needs to sharply cut back the 
priority package. 
 
